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Abstract 
“The success of this revolution I owe to two: First is God. Second is the journalist.” 
(Mohammed Elkish, head of the international media unit, NTC) 
 
During the spring of 2011 thousands of international journalists entered rebel-held eastern 
Libya to report on the popular uprising that rapidly developed into a full-blown civil war. The 
revolutionary insurgency was in need of both international legitimacy and support for their 
struggle, and they got what they wanted: Support from the western public, and military 
support in form of a UN certified air based bombing campaign against their adversary, 
Muammar Gaddafi. This qualitative study examines how the Libyan rebel movement 
organized, strategized and worked to facilitate for, and influence, international journalists 
during the conflict. The research is based on interviews with international journalists, Libyan 
rebel activists, and people in leading positions in the Libyan rebel movement, the National 
Transitional Council. I will show how the rebels saw international journalist and massive 
media attention as a vital weapon in their struggle. Without this kind of attention the rebels 
hardly believe they would have succeeded, and they assume that their uprising could have 
been stifled. The rebels also believe their intense media efforts helped drum up the support for 
the UN Security Council’s decision to intervene in the conflict through a military campaign. I 
will show how the rebel movement’s media organization was relatively large, was structured, 
and emerged from below. There was no clear plan from the beginning, but as events 
intensified both strategy and organizing evolved rapidly. Their own ‘Rebel Media Center’ 
was central in this work.  The rebels used propaganda as a part of their strategy, at times they 
mislead and produced false information, and many journalists used this information 
uncritically. I will argue that during the war in Libya there was a mutual dependence between 
the journalists and the rebels. Both groups needed each other to achieve what they wanted. 
This win-win situation helped the rebels’ cause, and by savvy and intense efforts they 
managed to take advantage of the situation and benefit from it.  
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1 Introduction 
It was an overwhelming welcome. On February 23, 2011, three days after Muammar 
Gaddafi’s men fled Benghazi, CNN’s Ben Wedeman was the first international journalist to 
enter the rebel-held eastern Libya. Tens of thousands of rallying citizens met him, praising his 
presence and thanking him for being there. His live report was the first TV-pictures the world 
could see from the popular uprising. “I almost feel that I am not up to the task of conveying 
the significance of what we are seeing here”, Wedeman said. Behind him, thousands of 
Libyans shouted together: “CNN! CNN!”  
This thesis is about the Libyan rebels. The nonviolent popular uprising that started in 
February 2011, turned into a full-blown rebellion when anti-government protests were met 
with violence from the regime, and the opposition chose to take up arms. Dentists, teachers, 
mechanics, barbers and students got together. Even Libyans living abroad came home to 
participate. Together they had one main goal: To force the government army to give up, and 
for their dictator through 42 years, Muammar Gaddafi, to step down. Because their opponent 
was militarily superior, the rebel movement would not succeed on their own. The 
international community chose to intervene with an UN-certified air based bombing 
campaign. Eight months later, Gaddafi was shot dead. 
The Libyan rebels, and the spectacle they made, managed to grab the world’s attention. 
International media flocked in thousands to Benghazi, the eastern city that became the center 
of the rebellion. The rebels’ opinions and their struggle were heavily publicized, daily, 
throughout the world. People worldwide could closely follow the development of the war on 
Libyan soil. This thesis examines how the rebels managed to gain, and keep, this attention. It 
examines the rebels’ media strategies and to what extent they used international media as a 
tool in their insurgency. 
Those undertaking an insurgency are trying to find a way to use their strengths against the 
weakness of their more powerful adversary. The capability to gain legitimacy and external 
support can be two such strengths. Insurgents often seek to legitimize their use of violence, 
and translate this into meaningful support for their cause. Using international media to spread 
the word can be an important and helpful strategy. My research question reflects this logic: 
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In what way did the Libyan rebel movement organize and facilitate for 
international journalists during their rebellion, what factors motivated their 
effort, and to what extent did they see media as a useful tool in this struggle? 
Sub-questions:  
• How did the rebels’ media organization emerge, who took the initiatives 
and how did it develop? 
• In what way did the rebels believe an emphasis on media could help their 
cause directly?  
• The journalists and the rebels worked closely in the same environment 
over months: In what way were the journalists and the rebels in need of 
each other? 
When this is written, in the spring of 2012, just one year have passed since the so-called Arab 
Spring started to unfold. The amount of academic work on the issue is now growing. Still, 
until now, little has been written academically about the Libyan rebel movement’s media 
effort. This is clearly a knowledge gap. I believe it is important that someone investigate this 
issue. Here are my reasons: 
• When the Arab Spring unfolded we saw a new wave of popular uprisings in the 
Middle East, and this phenomenon should be investigated thoroughly. To an unknown 
degree, media have played a part in these uprisings. To examine one case—like the 
Libyan rebellion—can help illuminate and exemplify media’s role in such uprisings. 
• To examine how a modern insurgency emphasize international media in their strategy 
is important, in order to understand one aspect of the complicated dynamics of a 21st 
century revolution. The issue of an insurgency’s ability to influence media is 
important to investigate and discuss in today’s world, because media have the ability 
to be an agenda-setter, and can affect both public opinion and states’ foreign policy.  
• The Libyan rebel movement managed to do something many insurgencies have not 
managed before them: To grab the world’s attention and get international support in 
form of a UN Security Council resolution. The international community intervened in 
the rebels’ struggle and bombed their adversary to retreat. Thus, it is crucial to 
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investigate what this group did to obtain such attention and support. If an emphasis on 
media actually can help getting international support for an insurgency’s cause, such 
efforts are something that must be examined comprehensively.  
• To describe and analyze the Libyan rebels organization, motivation and effort is 
needed to lay an academic groundwork, which later can be used as a necessary 
platform for further research on similar issues.  
I assume that the reader to some extent is informed about the scope of the recent revolutionary 
wave in the Arab world, about its relative successes and about its bloody tragedies. I also 
expect the reader to have some knowledge about the main aspects of the international 
intervention in the Libyan conflict. In addition I assume that the reader takes into account the 
scope of international media’s comprehensive coverage of international events in today’s 
globalized world, and thus its possibility to influence opinions.  
My personal motivation for writing a thesis about the Libyan rebellion is two-sided. Firstly, 
my classes at the University of Oslo in the beginning of 2011 allowed me to dig deeper into 
the new uprisings taking place in the Arab world at the time. I took courses in both 
international security strategy and conflict related journalism, and the topics we discussed 
allowed me to see the unfolding events from various perspectives. I wrote papers on the 
Libyan revolution, insurgency, and journalism’s impact on conflicts. Secondly, I hold a 
bachelors degree in journalism from the University College in Oslo, and have been working 
part time in the national press alongside my studies. I am a big consumer of international 
news, and the Libyan rebellion early caught my attention. I read all I could find about the 
conflict, watched documentaries and followed the work of several journalists and 
photographers. I early noticed something interesting: An organized “Rebel Media Center” met 
the journalists that entered Libya from the east, during the spring. I wanted to find out more 
about the effort behind such a center: Who had set it up? And why? A combination of my 
interest in insurgencies, the new Arabic uprisings, and a profound interest in journalism, lead 
me to write this master’s thesis.  
To answer my research question I had to travel to Libya. I did so in a highly unstable post-
conflict period, five months after Gaddafi was killed, and the war had ended. It was vital for 
the project to interview first-hand sources. I found qualitative research interviewing as the 
considerably most efficient method to obtain the information I needed. Before the trip I 
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interviewed journalists from around the world, who covered the Libyan conflict. In Benghazi 
and Tripoli I interviewed people that were central in the rebel movement, from activists in the 
front line, to people in leading positions. This thesis is based on these interviews. In all 14 key 
informants have contributed in the research. 
I will start off with a chapter that reviews existing literature on this academic field. This part 
is important because it provides theoretical background, support and context to the new 
information that will be displayed. Next comes a chapter that looks briefly into the most 
significant history of Libya, and more comprehensively into the Libyan revolution. A proper 
presentation of the eight-month long war, and its international implications, is needed to 
understand and contextualize the Libyan rebels’ actions. Many of the interviews conducted 
are closely connected to the timeline of war, and this timeline is thus important for the reader 
to have in mind. The third chapter is a presentation of my methodology, how I carried out my 
research, how I worked in Libya, how I chose my research design and what considerations I 
did during the research period. This chapter also presents all my informants, in order to 
explain why each of them is relevant for this thesis. These first three chapters build up to the 
most extensive chapter, “Results and analysis”, where I present my findings in three 
subchapters: The journalists, the young activists, and the leadership. The information I have 
obtained is categorized further into sections relevant for each subchapter, and is related with 
existing literature and theories on the subject. Such organization of the chapter will help 
create a comprehensive picture on the Libyan rebel movement’s actions and efforts towards 
the international media during the conflict. In the end I will conclude and draw a line between 
the different chapters, which hopefully will enable a deeper understanding of the implications 
of this group’s actions.  
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2 Existing literature and theory 
This chapter is a collection of existing literature and theoretical aspects that can help 
illuminate and contextualize the new information this thesis will bring forward. The point is 
to see previous academic work in relation to my specific topic. Such a connection is necessary 
to paint a proper picture on the phenomenon I am describing, and to help the reader to keep 
track of the context this thesis is written within. I want to add new information to a well-
studied academic field, and this chapter is needed to make this connection. To begin with, I 
will define and discuss the term “insurgency” and its correlation to politics and political goals. 
Secondly, I will explain different strategies that insurgencies can use to reach such goals. 
Gaining support and legitimacy will be central in the argument. Thirdly, I will theoretically 
discuss how insurgencies can gain support and legitimacy, and emphasize how international 
media can be essential in this process. The extension of that argument will lead to a 
discussion on the power of media, the role of journalists in war, and how media can affect 
both a conflict and foreign policy-making. I believe this theoretical argument, as a whole, will 
help explain what happened in Libya during the armed uprising, and illuminate my findings in 
a proper manner. 
2.1 Types of insurgency 
Why do people rise up? Ted R. Gurr claims that although there are an infinite variety of 
motives for rebellion, the key motivational factor arises when people perceive a ‘discrepancy 
between the goods and conditions of life they believe are their due, and the goods and 
conditions they can in fact get and keep’ (Gurr in Brooker, 2010: 182). Gurr emphasizes that 
this “relative deprivation is related to aspirations that are perceived to be realistic and 
attainable” (ibid.). It is not about what they have and what they want, it is about what the have 
and what they believe they are capable of attaining. With this in mind I find it reasonable to 
start out broad, to understand the core of insurgency. In his most famous book, one of the 
most influential theorist on warfare, Carl von Clausewitz pointed out two definitions central 
for understanding warfare at large, but also essential for grasping a phenomenon with many 
names: “stateless warfare”, “irregular warfare” and “insurgency”. Clausewitz wrote that we 
should imagine a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to throw his opponent in 
order to make him incapable of further resistance. War is thus an act of force to compel our 
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enemy to do our will (Clausewitz, 1976:75). To be more precise he added that “war is not 
merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, 
carried out with other means (…) The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching 
it” (ibid: 87). These other means are now commonly specified as organized violence 
(Brooker, 2010:11). These definitions of war can be used as a point of departure for 
understanding my topic, the irregular type of stateless warfare, most usually known as 
insurgency. Many have of course mentioned Clausewitz when speaking of insurgency before 
me: At the height of the period of insurgency known as the ‘wars of national liberation’ 
(1962-1965), journalist Robert Taber, who had spent time in Cuba during the revolution there, 
said: “The guerrilla fighter’s war is political and social, his means are at least as political as 
they are military, his purpose almost entirely so. Thus we may paraphrase Clausewitz: 
Guerrilla war is the extension of politics by means of armed conflict” (Baylis, 2010: 186). 
One of the most influential guerrilla theoreticians is Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara himself. He too 
sees guerrilla war as political. In his book Guerrilla Warfare he writes:  
Why does the guerrilla fighter fight? We must come to the inevitable conclusion that the guerrilla 
fighter is a social reformer, that he takes up arms responding to the angry protest of the people against 
their oppressors, and that he fights in order to change the social system that keeps all his unarmed 
brothers in ignominy and misery (Guevara, 1961: 10). 
Insurgency is a broad term, and should be discussed and defined in order to avoid 
misunderstandings: The Oxford English Dictionary defines insurgency as “One who rises in 
revolt against constituted authority; a rebel who is not recognized as a belligerent." For J. 
Kiras (Baylis 2010: 188) insurgency is best understood by first considering what it is not. 
Insurgency is not conventional war or terrorism, for example, but shares the use of force to 
achieve a political end. In an insurgency, the adversaries are asymmetric and the insurgents 
are the weaker part, and almost always a sub-state group attempting to bring about political 
change by administrating and fighting more effectively than its state-based foe. Insurgency, 
unlike terrorism, is characterized by support and mobilization of a significant proportion of 
the population (ibid.) Kiras stress that insurgency is a broad term, and differ widely in terms 
of character (social, cultural and economic) and type (revolutionary, partisan, guerrilla, 
liberation, or civil war), but obtaining power and political control is the desired outcome.  
Categorizing insurgency into three main, general types has long been the conventional 
wisdom among analysts of insurgency. Paul Brooker labels them as expeller, revolutionary 
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and separatist. One can categorize them by asking: “What are the insurgency’s goals and how 
is organized violence being used to achieve them?” (Brooker, 2010: 34). According to 
Brooker the word ‘expeller’ is an “appropriate label for all insurgencies fighting to expel a 
foreign state that is invading, occupying or colonially ruling an insurgent’s nation, religious 
community, local community or other traditionally or ideologically defined ‘home’” (ibid: 
35). The expeller type has been the most common of the three The separatist type of 
insurgency has a desire to separate from the local state and establish an independent state. The 
type includes not only secessionist groups seeking a fully independent state but also those 
groups that are merely seeking some regional autonomy for their distinctive ethnic or social 
group (ibid.). The revolutionary type of insurgents is seeking to overthrow their local state or 
create a new form of state and society. 
2.2 Strategy: Time, space, legitimacy and support 
Those undertaking an insurgency are trying to find a way to use their strengths, such as 
mobility and organization, against the weakness of their more powerful adversary. The goal 
for the irregular leader is to pit the organization’s strength against enemy weakness (Kiras in 
Baylis: 2010: 189). Scholars seem to agree on what these strengths are: Insurgents are able to 
achieve success by gaining an advantage in terms of four main dimensions: time, space, 
legitimacy and support. Kiras points out that these dimensions of conflict are not mutually 
exclusive, and “excellence in one dimension will not compensate for drastic shortcomings in 
the others” (ibid.). However, because every conflict has its own unique setting and specific 
characteristics, the importance of the different dimensions changes from insurgency to 
insurgency. In this thesis, because of the approach I have chosen to take in the study of the 
Libyan rebels, legitimacy and support are the two most important dimensions. They are most 
interesting and important to my focus, as ‘time’ and ‘space’ are mostly related to military and 
fighting strategy, while ‘legitimacy’ and ‘support’ are more related to the information and 
media effects of the insurgency. I will only briefly sketch the first two dimensions, while 
dealing more thoroughly with the two latter.   
Time has historically been an essential factor in many insurgencies. With sufficient time, an 
insurgent group can organize, sap the resolve of its adversary, and build a conventional force 
capable of seizing control of the state (Baylis, 2010: 189). As Henry Kissinger famously has 
pointed out, “the insurgent wins if he does not lose” (Mack, 1975: 178). Mao organized time 
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in his writings into three interrelated phases: the strategic defense, the stalemate, and the 
strategic offensive. Also, as some will say we have seen in Afghanistan (Baker, 2011), 
endless struggle without an obvious victory will eventually lead to exhaustion, collapse, or 
withdrawal of the enemy (Baylis, 2010: 189). Space allows insurgent groups to decide where 
and when to fight. If their adversary appears in overwhelming numbers, insurgents can make 
use of space to withdraw and fight when the odds are in their favor. Defenders against 
subversion cannot be everywhere at the same time without spreading their forces too thinly 
and inviting attack from locally superior guerrilla forces (ibid: 190). Because of this, 
insurgents are provided with the opportunity to establish safe areas or bases from which they 
can expand their control. 
2.3 Importance of legitimacy and support 
In this thesis legitimacy and support is at the centre of what I want to investigate. The 
importance of these two dimensions for an insurgency can hardly be overestimated. 
Insurgents are weaker militarily than their powerful nation-state adversary, and their ability to 
recruit and mobilize the masses is a critical part of their asymmetric warfare strategy. This is a 
fundamental vulnerability, if it does not work (Forest 2009: xi). According to Kiras, external 
physical and moral support for an insurgent cause is a prerequisite for success (ibid:188). 
Regardless of space and time, “an insurgent campaign will almost always fail if it cannot 
attract substantial internal and external support”. As Kiras states, few insurgencies succeed 
without some form of support. Support, however, is interlinked with and inseparable from the 
legitimacy of the organization, because violence conducted without a comprehensible 
political purpose will generate little popular support (ibid: 192).  
Insurgents often seek to legitimize their use of violence and translate this into meaningful 
support for their cause, by demonstrating moral superiority over those who represent the state. 
As Kiras says, moral superiority of the guerrillas is a cornerstone of all irregular theory. 
Insurgents derive support from the people and they often cultivate their relationship with 
them. Internally, one of the most important jobs for the insurgents is to demonstrate the moral 
superiority in routine contact, so that people differentiate the insurgents from bandits and 
counter-insurgents (Baylis, 2010:193). The revolutionary Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara insisted that 
the peasants understood that the guerrillas were as much social reformers as they were 
protectors of the people (Guevara, 1961:10). Government brutality also allows insurgents to 
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act as the avengers of the people, helping to cement the ties between them. Still, the most 
powerful method of legitimizing a struggle is to link military operations with a justifiable 
political end. Causes vary, but self-determination has been the most pervasive and successful 
rallying cry. Other successful causes blend social, cultural and economic issues into a 
powerful political message that the government or an international audience find difficult to 
counter or resist (Baylis, 2010:195).  
With legitimacy at hand, one can achieve support. Insurgents can look for support from both 
domestic (internal) and international (external) sympathizers. I will start with discussing the 
importance of internal support. As Carl von Clausewitz suggested: “Support, in form of 
public opinion, is one of the centers of gravity in a popular uprising.” It is essential to have 
the peoples support, and Mao’s much quoted argument about internal support says exactly 
that: “The guerrilla is likened to fish that swim in a sea of popular support: without the sea, 
the fish will die.” (quoted in Baylis: 192). As an insurgency goes on, this type of vital popular 
support can be both passive and active (Brooker: 2010: 175). Passive support is merely the 
denying of information to the insurgents’ enemy, namely a state’s counterinsurgency forces. 
Information is a crucial aspect of counterinsurgent capability and therefore the denial of this 
information, by the population, greatly increases the insurgents’ military capability. Active 
support is quite different. It helps provide information, intelligence, concealment (in their 
homes), shelter, hiding places for arms and equipment, medical assistance, guides, and liaison 
agents. Such help can be of vital importance for an insurgency (ibid: 176). The insurgents’ 
support base also provides human assistance as a recruiting base from which new recruits 
come forward and join the rebellion. Che Guevara wrote that guerrilla war is people’s war; to 
attempt to carry out such a war without the population’s support is the prelude for inevitable 
disaster (Guevara: 1961: 143).  
External support can be seen, as said, as a prerequisite for success. Such support can be 
material, in form of cross-boarder sanctuaries and weapons support, or moral, in the case of 
political recognition and lobbying (Baylis, 2010:193). History has shown that insurgencies 
aggressively pursue external aid, using sophisticated approaches; they seek to influence the 
media, NGOs, and broader public. In “Marketing of a Rebellion” Clifford Bob writes that 
insurgents do “nothing more than their opponents – governments, multinational corporations, 
and international financial institutions, with huge resources and privileged access to the 
international press. But where the powerful buy the world’s best public relations machines, 
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the insurgents must bootstrap themselves to the fore” (Bob, 2005: 23). Raising international 
awareness is the key. For many insurgencies this is the first major obstacle, and the marketing 
often happens in direct competition with its domestic foe. Alongside lobbying, using the 
international press is crucial to spread the word about the insurgencies’ activities (ibid.). 
Journalistic reporting has unparalleled reach, and a compelling account in a reputable outlet 
can alert uninformed audiences to a distant conflict (more on that later). Most local 
insurgencies have little resources, and frequent and relatively cheap strategies can be political 
spectacle, a major and highly visible event. Common forms of such spectacle include strikes, 
mass marches or violence. Violence often attracts media more effectively than peaceful events 
(ibid: 26).  Whether violent or nonviolent, the key is to grab media attention and dramatically 
encapsulate the rebels identity, grievances, and demands. Without such spectacle, the 
likelihood of sustained and substantial media attention is small.  Bob, who has studied how 
insurgent groups reach out for external support, says they use several tactics to form their 
message to distant audiences: They simplify and universalize their conflicts, and demonize 
prominent opponents, embrace voguish rhetoric, and appeal to the self-interest—as well as the 
sympathy—of international actors. According to Bob, insurgents, as a first step, strip their 
conflict of complexity and ambiguity, projecting a clear picture of an important struggle 
against a villainous foe (ibid: 30). At a deeper level, movements tap into cultural motifs 
having wide and perhaps universal appeal, such as good guy versus bad guy or underdog 
versus bully. While they play on their repression, these insurgencies emphasize their 
organizational coherence and their courage, rather than their helplessness.  
2.4 Propaganda  
The terms propaganda and psychological operations (PSYOPS) is also necessary to take into 
account. Insurgents as well as governments can use such methods as an essential part of their 
strategy. In its most neutral sense propaganda means to disseminate or promote particular 
ideas. The definition that now is most widely used is presented in Garth Jowett and Victoria 
O’Donnell’s book ‘Propaganda and Persuasion’. Their definition focuses on the 
communication process – most specifically on the purpose of the process:  
“Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and 
direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett and 
O’Donnell, 1999: 6).  
11 
 
It is here emphasized that the propaganda is the result of a consciously and well-planned 
strategy with a clear aim from the propagandist. Under the term propaganda also follows three 
categories: Black, white and gray propaganda. Black propaganda is credited to a false source 
and spread lies, fabrications, and deceptions. It is the ‘big lie’, including all types of creative 
deceit (ibid: 13). The white type comes from a source that is identified correctly, and the 
information of the message tends to be accurate. It is still important to note that although what 
the audience get is close the truth, it is presented in a manner that attempts to convince the 
audience that the sender is the good guy with the best ideas and best political ideology. White 
propaganda attempts to build credibility with the audience, because this can become useful at 
some point in the future (ibid).  Gray propaganda is naturally somewhere in the middle. The 
source may or may not be correctly identified, and the accuracy of the information is 
uncertain. Propaganda is closely related to the term psychological operations (PSYOPS): “It 
is efforts to convey selected truthful information and indicators to foreign audiences to 
influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of their 
governments, organizations, groups, and individuals” (Forest, 2009: 10). 
This strategy of war is well known in history, also by insurgencies. In an article from July 
2007, Economist noted that in the new asymmetric wars “the hand-held video camera has 
become as important a tool of insurgency as the AK-47 or the RPG rocket-launcher”. It is 
interesting to point out how one of the most brutal irregular fighting groups in the world, al-
Qaida, see the importance of pictures and videos. At the time of writing, Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
was number two in the terrorist organization and said: “More than half of this battle is taking 
place in the battlefield of the media.” Or as one jihadi magazine wrote: “Film everything; this 
is good advice for all mujahideen. Brothers, don't disdain photography. You should be aware 
that every frame you take is as good as a missile fired at the Crusader enemy and his puppets” 
(Economist: 2007). Insurgent groups do not always have to take their own videos and 
pictures. If lucky, they can get journalists to do it for them. 
Another insurgent group that used information in their guerrilla tactics was the Zapatistas in 
the southern Mexico (EZLN). Analysis has suggested that the group’s use of internet in the 
uprising define the EZLN as the world’s “first informational guerrilla movement”. (Castells, 
in Turner, 2005) However, it is possible to question the effect of such tactics. While the use of 
information-age technology to stimulate international support can be a useful strategy for 
many contemporary social struggles, “it does not guarantee the procurement of significant 
12 
 
political, economic and social change” (Turner: 2005).  After more than a decade of struggle, 
the Zapatista-guerilla has not caused the radical reconstruction of the Mexican political 
system that they had hoped for. 
2.5 Journalism and the CNN effect  
What power lies within journalism in relation to war? Todd Gitlin lines up the following logic 
when explaining what power the media can have on individuals: People directly know only 
tiny regions of social life; their beliefs and loyalties lack deep tradition. Because of this 
people have a major vulnerability to rumor, news and trends. In lack of deep knowledge, for 
instance in international relation and conflicts, people are pressed to rely on mass media for 
bearings in an “obscure and shifting world” (Gitlin, 2003: 1). The media bring a manufactured 
public world into the private space, Gitlin argue, and people find themselves relying on the 
media for concepts, for images of their heroes, for guiding information, for emotional 
charges, for a recognition of public values, for symbols in general, and even for language. He 
continues: “Of all the institutions of daily life, the media specialize in orchestrating everyday 
consciousness – by virtue of their pervasiveness, their accessibility and their centralized 
symbolic capacity” (ibid.).   Further he argues that every day, “directly and indirectly, by 
statement and omission, with pictures and words, (…) the mass media produce fields of 
definition and association, symbol and rhetoric, through which ideology becomes manifested 
and concrete.” In the context of war, the logical inference that follows this argument is that 
media organizations have a major opportunity to create and shape a population’s image of a 
given war, and the popular impression about the people that is fighting in it. In lack of other 
types of information, journalism often is the only source, and thus it becomes powerful. 
A criticism of how this power is used comes forth in an analysis on today’s mainstream 
journalism from conflict zones, by Johan Galtung, where he diagnoses the reporting as 
violence-oriented (Lynch, McGoldrick 2005: 6). He says that a majority of war journalism 
focuses on the conflict arena, where there are two parties, and their sole goal is to ‘win’. He 
further argues that the mainstream war reporting sees war as a zero-sum game, where the 
space and time is closed, and the causes and exits of war are within the arena. Galtung argues 
that the reporting supports a dehumanization of the enemy and that it is reactive; it is waiting 
for violence before reporting. It focuses only on the visible effects of violence, like killed, 
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wounded and material damage (ibid.). Basically he claims that most journalism from conflict 
areas is simplified and stripped of complexity.  
Gitlin’s argument shows how individuals are affected by media power, but societies and 
politics can be affected as well. A theoretical term called the “CNN effect” has over the last 
decades been used in discussion about such potential power. During the 1980s the 
proliferation of new technologies transformed the potential of the news media to provide a 
constant flow of global real-time news. Tiananmen Square in Beijing, the collapse of 
communism symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the Gulf war became major media 
events communicated to Western audiences instantaneously via TV news media (Robinson 
1999: 301). During this period the question was being asked as to what extent this media 
pervasiveness had impacted upon governments, particularly the process of foreign policy-
making. The new technologies appeared to reduce the scope for calm deliberation over policy, 
forcing policy-makers to respond to whatever issue journalists focused on (ibid.). The phrase 
‘CNN effect’ encapsulated the idea that real-time communications technology could provoke 
major responses from domestic audiences and political elites to global events. There has been 
a growing and heated debate on this phenomenon since it was first brought forth, and also a 
growing amount of literature. In “Clarifying the CNN effect” Steven Livingston claims that 
the growing literature suggests at least three conceptually distinct and analytically useful 
understandings of media’s effect on the foreign policy process. We may speak of the CNN 
effect as 1) an accelerant to policy decision-making, 2) an impediment to the achievement of 
desired policy goals, and 3) a policy agenda-setting agent (Livingston 1997:2). Here is what 
the three effects mean:  
“Media as an accelerant” mean that one of the potential effects of global, real-time media is 
the shortening of response time for decision-making. During time of war, live, global 
television offer potential security-intelligence risks. Decisions are made in haste, sometimes 
dangerously so. Former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker highlights this understanding 
of the CNN effect. “The one thing it does,” he says, “is to drive policymakers to have a policy 
position. I would have to articulate it very quickly. You are in a real-time mode. You don’t 
have time to reflect” (Livingston, 1997: 3). What is often overlooked, however, is the 
constructive role played by the real-time, global media. Using media can be a diplomacy 
method of sending signals and statements to other leaders. It constructs a real-time diplomacy, 
and it is visible in most foreign policy issues to receive media attention (ibid).  
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According to Livingston there are at least two types of media-related policy impediments. 
Firstly, one is emotional: Grisly coverage may undermine the morale in the population to 
continue the war. During the Vietnam War it was called the Vietnam Syndrome: The concern 
that media coverage had the potential to undermine public support for an operation and erode 
troop morale on the ground. As such, American credibility and resolve in the world was 
undermined. In October 1993, pictures of a dead American soldier being dragged through the 
streets of Mogadishu, Somalia, revived some of the same effect (ibid: 4). Secondly, it can be a 
threat to operational security. The fact remains that some operations are extremely sensitive to 
media exposure. Maintaining operational security during conventional war and tactical 
operations is essential. In these circumstances, media have the technological capacity to 
hinder some types of operations simply by exposing them. 
The part of the CNN effect, where media as an agenda-setter, is seen when emotional, 
compelling coverage of atrocities or humanitarian crises reorder foreign policy priorities. 
James Baker has said:  
“All too often, television is what determines what is a crisis. Television concluded the break-up of the 
former Yugoslavia and the fighting in the Balkans was a crisis, and they began to cover it and cover it. 
And so the Clinton administration was left to find a way to do something. Yet they didn’t do that in 
Rwanda where the excesses were every bit as bad, if not worse.” (Livingston, 1997:6) 
Agents for the agenda-setting theory argue that the choices and selections of national interests 
are too heavily weighted in favour of what happens to get covered by CNN or other media. 
The argument is that press, for a variety of commercial and professional reasons, is drawn to 
the dramatic visuals found in most humanitarian emergencies. “The pitched battles between 
gun-totting teenagers in the streets of some far away place, massive flows of refugees, the 
pathos of a starving child, all make for compelling television and news” (ibid). This can of 
course be seen as criticism of governments that just follow the news to satisfy worried 
domestic media consumers, but it can also be seen as a criticism of the media itself.  
The CNN effect-theory is much debated because of the lack of hard evidence of the effect of 
media in a given foreign policy event. Livingston claims different policies obviously has 
different objectives, actual and potential costs, and operational requirements. As a result, the 
level of interest media shows, and the potential consequence of that interest, varies 
substantially (Livingston, 1997:15). Piers Robinson have used six case studies of 
humanitarian interventions to test the link between media coverage and policy decision 
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making, including conflicts in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda, which lead him to 
conclude that the effects of media coverage are only one of a series of factors contributing to 
policy decisions (Walters, 2004). We cannot know for certain what kind of response media 
coverage will have on a given conflict, it can both be strong and weak, but the notion of a 
potential CNN effect is certainly important to have in mind. 
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3 Background 
This chapter puts the Libyan rebel movement’s actions into a proper context. Even though 
many rebel groups’ actions theoretically can be placed in the same category and seen as 
similar, each conflict is unique and has it own setting. To help explain the roots of rebellion, 
and the Libyan rebels’ choices during the war, background and history should be taken into 
account. In this chapter I will present what I believe is the relevant context to illuminate. I 
will firstly point out some essential facts about Libya’s physical, human and economic terrain, 
as well as the country’s modern political history with Muammar Gaddafi 42 years long reign. 
Secondly, and indeed most importantly, I will discuss how the Arab Spring came to Libya and 
ended in a full-blown rebellion. Here it is needed to go through the key moments and military 
battles of the eight months long war, the formation of the National Transitional Council 
(NTC) and the UN-legalized and NATO-led intervention. My informants are naturally 
explaining their actions in connection with the timeline of the war, and with a proper 
presentation of this period it will be easier to understand the conditions my informants have 
acted in. I will here also map the level of external support the Libyan rebels received during 
the revolution, and discuss how vital the support may have been for the outcome. This is 
important in order to understand why the rebels did what they could to influence the outside 
world’s attitude towards them, via the media. 
3.1 Physical, human terrain and economy 
Libya occupies a strategic location along the Mediterranean coast, sharing boarders with six 
other African countries. With its 1760 square kilometers it is the fourth largest country in the 
continent, but because the Sahara desert covers more than 95 % of the country, and therefore 
most of it is uninhabitable, more than 90 % of Libya’s six million people live along the 
Mediterranean coast (CIA, 2011). Traditionally Libya has been divided into three distinct 
regions, namely Cyrenaica to the east, Tripolitania in the northwest, and Fezzan in the 
southwest. The three regions have historically been relatively separate and autonomous 
(Vandewalle 2006: 11). Vast stretches of desert between the regions inhibited integration for 
centuries. Thus, the regions developed separate political and economic identities. Enmity 
between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, dominated by their respective capital cities Benghazi and 
Tripoli, has grown since the independence from Italy in 1951, as both regions struggled for 
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control of national leadership (Bell et.al, 2011, part 1: 15). Despite increasing political 
centralization between the territories that began under Ottoman rule and continued under 
Gaddafi, regionalism remains a defining feature of Libyan politics (ibid.). Cyrenaica served as 
the seat of power for the monarch King Idris, who ruled Libya from independence in 1951 to 
1969, when Gaddafi seized power in a military coup. Of central importance to understand 
parts of the conflict in Libya, the Institute of the Study of War assess that “the stark contrast 
between the strength of the rebellion in Cyrenaica and the relative degree of loyalty to the 
regime across much of Tripolitania and Fezzan revel the underlying political dynamics that 
shaped the conflict in Libya” (Ibid: 15). The degree of hostility towards Gaddafi’s regime in 
the east may have been some of the roots that made the rebellion possible. 
Libya’s vast economic resources should also be kept in mind while analyzing the war in 
Libya. Decades of rapid oil-fuelled growth transformed Libya from one of the poorest and 
least developed countries in the world into one of the wealthier countries in Africa and the 
Arab World. The Libyan economy depends almost entirely upon revenues from the oil sector, 
which contribute about 95 % of export earnings, 25 % of GDP, and 80 % of government 
revenue. In 2010 the country produced 1.8 million barrels per day, and has one of the 
continent’s largest proven oil reserves at 43.7 billions barrels (CIA, 2011). 
3.2 Gaddafi, tribes, allegiance and military  
As well as regionalism, the complex tribal system of Libya must also be seen as a factor of 
major significance in Libyan politics and society. There are about 140 tribes in the country, 
but only 30 of them is said to have political influence (Spiegel Online, 2011). After taking 
power in 1969, Gaddafi began to utilize the tribal system as a means of building support, 
reinforcing loyalties and awarding patronage. He became a manipulator in the way that he 
took a carrot-and-stick approach with the tribes. “In other words, tribes that were loyal to the 
revolutionary regime could expect material privileges, whereas tribes that voiced opposition 
were punished” (Ibid.). In this authoritarian system no civil society or political organization 
were permitted other than the regime. In return for absolute loyalty from tribe and family 
members, tribal leaders and family elders provided the leaders with material benefits and 
social security. By doing so, Gaddafi divided the Libyan society into those who were friends 
and those who were foes. Members of certain western tribes that closely aligned with Gaddafi 
were awarded and empowered through high-ranking positions (Mattes, 2011). Most of the 
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eastern tribes and rival elements of the west such as the Berbers were all excluded from the 
regime (Bell et.al. Part 1: 17). The weaknesses of such a strategy to keep power for a regime 
can now, after the revolution, more easily be seen. By excluding some regions and some 
tribes from privileges and power, the possibilities for these oppressed groups to rebel is 
increased.   
The beginning of this regime came in September 1969, when the 27-year-old captain in the 
Libyan Air Force, Muammar Gaddafi and his allied in the Free Officers Union, overthrew the 
Libyan monarch, King Idris. Throughout the 1960s, a number of political incidents reviled the 
low level of legitimacy the kingdom enjoyed outside Cyrenaica. The revolutionaries had also 
reviled the inability of King Idris to deal with the highly corrupt patrimonial system that had 
grown up around him (Vandewalle, 2006: 77). One of the “central pillars of the Gaddafi 
regime was the revolutionary committees, which served as his political apparatus, evolved 
into the de facto political party and were granted wide-ranging powers over society. 
Headquarters were established in every town to seize the leader’s authority” (Bell et. al, Part 
1: 22). For a great part the 42 year long period Gaddafi controlled the country, he relied on a 
highly personalized network of advisors and associates to run the regime and ensure the 
loyalty of those around him. As mentioned it consisted of loyal tribe members, many from his 
very own Gaddafa tribe, extended family members and a handful of trusted military officers 
and old friends from the Free Officers Union (Ibid: 21). As his eight children began to come 
of age during the 1990s several of them began to take on increasingly powerful roles in the 
government, the military and their fathers inner circle (ibid.). Over the last decades it became 
clear that his second eldest son, Saif al Islam Gaddafi, emerged as the most powerful of them 
and one of the strongest men in the regime.  
During the years in power, Gaddafi continuously faced a dilemma of needing a strong 
military to maintain power while the military, through coups and rebellion, posed the greatest 
threat to his rule (Bell et. al, Part 1: 22). Therefore, Gaddafi took deliberate precautions to 
protect his rule from the military by keeping it relatively small, poorly trained and ill 
equipped so it could not stage a coup (ibid.) He prevented aggression of the military units by 
parting them into divisions and corps formations, limiting force levels to brigade and battalion 
size. He also frequently shuffled the positions of senior officials according to their political 
loyalties and tribal allegiances. To further counterbalance the threat from the military, he built 
smaller, separate paramilitary forces that were more manageable and loyal the regular army 
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(ibid.).  By 2010 the Libyan armed forces had approximately 76,000 personnel: 50,000 in the 
army, 18,000 in the Air Force and 8,000 in the Navy (Cordesman and Nerguizian: 2010).  
This was the military power that the Libyan rebels, from the start of the uprising, had to face 
and challenge.  
3.3 The Arab spring and first stages of the civil war 
Before the Libyan revolution started, the so-called Arab spring was on fire. Massive popular 
demonstrations had forced Tunisia’s president Zine al-Abedine Ben Ali to leave power in 
January, and Egypt’s president Hosni Mubarak to step down in early February. Though there 
were no significant protests in Libya during January, Gaddafi’s attempt to support these two 
autocratic rulers indicated that he was aware that the wave of unrest could sweep into Libya. 
(Bell et. al: 24) As the first protest started in mid-February in the eastern part of the country, 
in Cyrenaica’s capital Benghazi, it quickly spread to other eastern cities. These 
demonstrations were undoubtedly influenced by the uprisings in the neighboring countries. At 
the 15th of February the regime arrested the human rights activist Fethi Tarbel, who had 
worked to free political prisoners, as a part of a nationwide effort to detain anti-regime 
activists. The arrest triggered a massive protest (Reuters, 2011). Hundreds gathered outside 
the police station, and a number of protesters were killed. Protests two days later, on the 17th, 
became significant. It was the “day of revolt”, an effort to bring thousands of protesters into 
the streets. Major demonstrations were reported in the cities of Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Darnah 
and Zintan, among others. Gaddafi forces responded by firing live ammunition at the crowds. 
More than a dozen demonstrators were killed (Al-Jazeera, 2011). A turning point in the early 
revolt came on the 20th, when protesters managed to attack and siege the central military 
compound within Benghazi, the same time as the interior minister and former Army officer, 
Abdel Fattah Younis, defected with his security force. The defection turned the momentum in 
eastern part of the country, and was also a major propaganda victory for the rebels (Bell et. al: 
25). Another dramatic defection came soon after, when Libya’s UN delegation said they sided 
with the revolt and called on the Libyan army to help overthrow Gaddafi (Reuters, 2011). The 
protesters in the east quickly armed themselves to fight Gaddafi’s forces, in what would 
become an eight months long civil war, a full-blown rebellion with advance, stalemate and 
retreat, until the rebels marched on towards Tripoli and took control in the middle of August. I 
will not outline the whole timeline of war, but mention the most significant moments. 
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3.4 The formation of NTC 
One significant moment, and important background for this thesis, is the formation of the 
National Transitional Council (NTC). When cities fell to the rebellion in the east, provisional 
councils, staffed by local educated professionals, were quickly organized in many of the 
eastern cities to provide basic services. But the development of an overarching governing 
council occurred at the same time, as former regime officials and recently returned expatriates 
formed a movement of political leadership in Benghazi (Bell et. al: 28). After meetings in 
Benghazi and other cities, the NTC’s announcement of the new political formation was made. 
Support was essential for the new organizations, and two former regime officials, Mahmood 
Jibril and Ali Al Issawi, were appointed to be foreign affairs representatives and tasked with 
securing international support. In late March, NTC published a document entitled “A vision 
of a democratic Libya.” It is clearly inspired by Western constitutional democracies. As an 
example: 
“…we will outline our aspirations for a modern, free and united state, following the defeat of the illegal 
Gaddafi regime.” And “We have learnt from the struggles of our past during the dark days of 
dictatorship that there is no alternative to building a free and democratic society and ensuring the 
supremacy of international humanitarian law and human rights declarations.” And “ (…) lead us to a 
civil society that recognizes intellectual and political pluralism and allows for the peaceful transfer of 
power through legal institutions and ballot boxes; in accordance with a national constitution crafted by 
the people and endorsed in a referendum” (NTC, 2011). 
According to an analysis by the Institute for the Study of War, the opposition movement’s 
need to secure the political and military support of Western countries likely influenced this 
growing modern political identity. The rapid creation of a central leadership, featuring 
expatriates that had spent much time in the West, gave the appearance of an organized 
movement that was sympathetic to the U.S and Europe. “Additionally, the subsequent release 
of a plan for a secular, liberal democracy signaled to its potential Western patrons that the 
rebels had an acceptable political identity” (Bell et.al: 28).  
3.5 International reactions and intervention 
Soon after the first protest became international news, and it was clear that Gaddafi used 
violence to stop the demonstrations, the first international reactions came.  In late February, 
because Russia and China was willing to back limited actions, the U.N. Security Council 
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imposed sanctions on Gaddafi and his family, with resolution 1970, and referred Libya's 
crackdown on rebels to the International Criminal Court. At the same time EU governments 
approved a package of sanctions against Gaddafi and his closest advisers including an arms 
embargo and bans on travel to the Europe (Reuters, 2011). In early March France was the first 
state to recognize the National Transitional Council as the legitimate representative of Libya's 
people. But this was not enough to stop the violence. The situation on the ground deteriorated 
for the rebels, as their advance was pushed back as Gaddafi launched offensives against the 
rebels in Misrata and Cyrenaican cities (Bell et. al, part 2: 7). Soon the stronghold Benghazi 
could fall. The international debate to take military actions against Gaddafi intensified 
following the passage of the resolution 1970. Britain and France led the charge, and the U.S 
joined. Still, some U.S officials were reluctant to back a potential no-fly zone because of the 
lack of comprehensive intelligence about the situation on the ground. Some was also worried 
that there was little understanding of the background and dispositions of the rebels, and 
expressed concern that some elements could have ties to al-Qaeda affiliates (ibid: 17). The 
famous French philosopher Bernard-Henri Levy went to Benghazi early in the uprising and 
lobbied for an intervention and had direct talks with president Nicolas Sarkozy (Al-Arabiya, 
2012). By March 15th UN’s position on military actions remained unsettled, but time was 
running short. The loyalist forces’ advance seemed to soon retake Benghazi, and if so, there 
would hardly be any opposition left for UN to throw their support behind. Gaddafi’s son Saif 
al-Islam told France-based TV channel Euronews: "Everything will be over in 48 hours." 
(Euronews, 2011) Gaddafi himself said: “We will come zenga, zenga. House by house, room 
by room." ... "It's over. The issue has been decided," Gaddafi said, offering pardon to those 
who lay down their arms. "We are coming tonight...We will have no mercy and no pity with 
them” (The Atlantic Wire, 2011). Finally, the UN acted. On March 17th the Security Council 
voted to authorize Resolution 1973. It granted member states the authority to use “all 
necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians under threat of attack from Libyan military 
forces. It also allowed the imposition of a no-fly zone, a strict arms embargo, freezing the 
regime’s assets, and travel ban on Libyan officials, but prohibited ground forces from 
occupying Libyan territory (UN, UNSCR 1973). French warplanes started enforcing the 
resolution by attacking Gaddafi’s forces on the outskirts of Benghazi on the 19th of March. 
After a no-fly zone was established over the eastern part of the Libya, attacks on Gaddafi’s 
ground forces gradually expanded over the rest of the country. As the fighting continued, the 
administration moved swiftly to transfer command to NATO, in order to minimize the U.S 
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role and allow Britain and France to take the lead. 14 of NATO’s 28 members participated in 
the operation: Belgium, Britain, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Spain, Turkey, and the United States. Four non-members 
also joined: Sweden, Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (Bell et. al, part 2: 27).  This 
massive amount of support for the Libyan rebels did not stop there. Domestic and 
international political considerations seemed to limit the extent of support many NATO 
members could provide the rebels, but Qatar supported the rebels in a bolder way. It provided 
political, military and economic support. For example the country made the single largest 
monetary pledge to the NTC, offering $400 to $500 million that the rebels could spend as 
needed (Ibid: 30). This financial support was critical to the rebels. The small oil-state Qatar 
also provided fuel to the rebel-held east, shipping gasoline, diesel and propane to Benghazi to 
supply the uprising. War supplies was also sent. The first reports of Qatari military equipment 
in rebel hands appeared in mid-April (Bell et. al part 3: 15, and McCaltshy, 2011). These 
shipments, consisting of bulletproof vests, helmets, and ammunition, were bound for the 
rebels besieged in Misrata. Qatari Prime Minister al Thani stated that assistance to the rebels 
could include “all other need, including defense equipment (…) It is time to help the Libyan 
people to defend themselves an to defend the Libyan people” (Washington Times, 2011). 
Qatar also sent military trainers to Libya to teach basic soldering and infantry tactics to 
volunteers outside Benghazi. 
During the intervention in the Libyan conflict NATOs warplanes flew more than 26,000 
sorties, including 9600 strike missions. More than 1000 tanks, vehicles and guns were 
destroyed, along with Gaddafi's command and control network. How many government 
soldiers died, is unknown (NATO in BBC, 2011). According to New York Times’ (2011) 
investigations, at least 40 civilians, and perhaps more than 70, were killed by NATO’s 
attacks. The victims, including at least 29 women or children, often had been asleep in homes 
when the ordnance hit (ibid.). Institute of the Study of War researchers claim that while the 
international intervention in Libya succeeded in preventing the rebels from falling to 
Gaddafi’s forces in the spring of 2011, it by no means brought about a quick end to the 
conflict. But NATO played a vital role in preventing Misrata’s fall to the regime as well as 
strengthening the rebels’ hold over eastern Libya (Bell et. al, Part 2: 30). 
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3.6 Western popular support of intervention 
In the context of the UN mandated military intervention in Libya, it is also central to discuss 
what level of support the Libyan rebels were given by the population in the Western 
countries. How did normal Western media consumers see the Libyan rebels’ struggle, which 
they were presented almost every day? Did the rebels’ message to journalists, about who they 
were and what they wanted, affect the media consumer’s thoughts? Surveys about the popular 
opinion conducted in the different Western states, can give some answers:  
Norway was one of the first states to declare willingness to participate with fighter jets, if a 
UN resolution were to be signed. Norway was also one of the states that were most active in 
the bombing of Libya. During the four months the country participated, their six fighter jets 
dropped 569 bombs on Libyan soil. (Aftenposten, 2011) This made the American president 
Barack Obama thank Norway for their efforts. “Norway boxes above its weight class”, 
Obama said. (Nettavisen, 2011) A survey by the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten in April 
showed that as much as 70 percent of the respondents thought it was right by the Norwegian 
government to participate in the military intervention. The survey shows a broad support by 
voters in all political parties from rightwing to the leftwing. (Aftenposten, 2011) About the 
same time as the survey in Norway was conducted, Ipsos polling conducted a survey in Great 
Britain, USA, France and Italy. It showed that the public clearly had mixed feelings about the 
involvement in Libyan affairs, but most were in favor of it. In Great Britain 50 percent of the 
population supported the military action, in USA 55 percent, in France 63 percent, and in Italy 
40 percent. But when the polling organization ask about this statement: “The 
UK/US/French/Italian and allied forces should seek to remove Libyan leader Muammar 
Gaddafi” the popular view was stronger in favor: 63 percent of the British, 71 percent of the 
Americans, 67 percent of the French, and 76 percent of the Italian believed Gaddafi should be 
removed by force. (Ipsos polling, 2011) This can be seen as a relatively strong support to the 
Libyan rebels’ prime cause, namely to push Gaddafi to leave power. 
3.7 Stalemate, negotiations and end of the conflict 
Even with supporting planes in the air, the war on the ground dragged on during the summer 
and lead to a deadly stalemate. The main battle line went back and forth along the 
Mediterranean coast, but also in the western mountains along the boarder of Tunisia 
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(AlJazeera, 2011). The stalemate in Cyrenaica coincided with an increasingly dire siege of the 
port city of Misrata in eastern Libya, where the uprising threatened Gaddafi’s hold over 
Tripolitania, and thus, the country (Bell et.al, Part 3: 6). Rebel officials estimated that 1500 
rebels and civilians were killed and 5000 wounded during the battle of Misrata (New York 
Times, 2011). At the height of the battle, an estimated 100,000 Misratans fled their homes to 
safer locations. The fighting damaged the city heavily. 
The months of this mutually hurting stalemate made actors on all sides begin to discuss the 
possibility of negotiating an end to the conflict. But negotiations never made progress. In an 
analysis on statements given about negotiations during the conflict, as I did as a term paper, I 
concluded that it was the never-ending stubbornness of the rebel movement, their never-
changing principle to throw Gaddafi from power, and the lack of willingness for concessions, 
that were the main reason why the fall of Gaddafi came with force, rather than negotiations 
(Bakke Foss, 2011). The reason for their hard bargaining-strategy, I argue, is that even though 
the time may have been ripe, NTC did not see a satisfying “way out”. This is a crucial factor 
for a negotiation to come underway. Also the hurting stalemate seemed to have given the 
rebels yet another reason to think that there was “no way back”. Furthermore, since the 
stalemate did not last longer than a few months, a moment of crucial desperation never came 
(ibid.).  
On the night of August the 20th, the battle of Tripoli began. It had been planed for a long time 
and featured three separate opposition groups acting in close cooperation: rebels based out of 
the Nafusa Mountains, Misrata, and from within Tripoli. Beforehand, massive weapon 
support had been given to the rebels. British, French and Qatari special operation forces in 
Libya provided weapons, fuel, food and medicine to rebels in Tripolitania (New York Times, 
2011). Coalition military advisors helped plan the assault using satellite imagery and other 
intelligence information. France conducted weapon drops in the mountains, and Sudan 
shipped arms over the border. Qatar alone provided over 20.000 tons of weapons (Bell et.al, 
Part 4: 22.). Exactly two months after the assault on Tripoli, Gaddafi’s final stronghold and 
birthplace, Sirte, fell. The same day rebel forces captured Gaddafi after engaging his convoy 
as he fled the city. He was alive—with wounds—but died before reaching the hospital, shot in 
the head during the ride (Guardian, 2011). On October 21st, NATO announced a preliminary 
decision to end operations. Six days later the UN Security Council passed a resolution to end 
its mandate permitting intervention (CNN, 2011). On October 23rd, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, the 
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leader of the NTC declared the liberation of Libya, eight months after the uprising against 
Muammar Gaddafi's 42-year rule began (AlJazeera, 2011).  
3.8 The rebels’ wrongdoings 
 I will now proceed to describe shortly some of the wrongdoings by the rebels during the 
revolution. This is important to have in mind while reading this thesis, because the thesis’ 
topic is how the rebels attempted to make a good impression on the world. The lack of control 
over rebel militias was a challenge for NTC’s authority. In July, Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
reported that fighters out of the Nafusa Mountains pillaged and destroyed property in several 
cities. The rebels shall have acknowledged that they were ignoring orders not to loot. Rebel 
fighters also beat people suspected of being loyalists and burned their homes, the organization 
said (New York Times, 2011). Later in the conflict, rebels out of Misrata turned their wrath 
against the nearby town of Twaragha. Opposition fighters looted and torched buildings in the 
largely deserted town. Even the NTC seemed unwilling to intervene in this matter, as one of 
the NTC leaders Mahmod Jibril stated: “Nobody has the right to interfere in this matter except 
the people of Misrata” (Human Rights Watch, 2011). HRW also documented that fifty-three 
people, apparent Gaddafi supporters, most likely were executed at a hotel in Sirte during the 
last week of fighting. The hotel was located in an area of the city that was under the control of 
anti-Gaddafi fighters from Misrata before the killings took place (Human Rights Watch, 
2011). Independent militias have also conducted arrests without any oversight. Coupled with 
the lack of a working judicial system, the influx of new prisoners has forced the rebels to hold 
more than 7000 detainees in makeshift prisons where Amnesty International found 
widespread abuse and occasional torture (Bell et.al, Part 4: 26-27). Also, rebel groups have 
often been targeting black Africans—very common among Libya’s migrant worker 
population—accusing them of serving as mercenaries for the Gaddafi regime (ibid). 
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4 Method 
The main aim of this chapter is to describe and explain the methodology of my research. 
Firstly, I will present a short summary of why I ended up seeing the qualitative methods, and 
the research interview, as the most constructive method for this thesis. I will thereafter give a 
more detailed report of how I carried out my research: Firstly, I will explain the research 
planning and trip to Libya. Secondly, I will discuss research design and sample. Of special 
importance is the presentation of how I selected the sample of informants, and who they are. 
Thirdly, I will explain how I conducted transcription, analysis and verification. This chapter is 
important, because it is necessary to be transparent about the research process, so the reader 
understands the process leading up to the conclusion.  
4.1 Choice of qualitative research and interview 
My research project can be placed under the relatively broad term ‘Case study’. The basic 
case study entails detailed and intensive analysis of a single case. It is concerned with the 
complexity and particular nature of the case in question (Bryman, 2008: 52). The most 
common use of the term ‘case’ associate the case study with a location, such as a community 
or organization. The emphasis tends to be upon an intensive examination of the setting (ibid: 
53). Both quantitative and qualitative methods are applicable, but the exponents of the case 
study design often favor the qualitative methods, such as participant observation and 
unstructured interviewing, because these methods are viewed as particularly helpful in the 
generation of an intensive, detailed examination of a case (ibid). There are three main features 
of qualitative research that should be taken into account. Firstly, it features an inductive view 
of the relationship between theory and research, whereby the former is generated by the latter 
(Bryman: 366). Secondly, it has an epistemological position described as interpretivist, 
meaning that, in contrast to the adoption of a natural scientific model in quantitative research, 
the stress is on the social world “through an examination of the interpretation of the world by 
its participants” (ibid). Thirdly, it is often connected to an ontological position described as 
constructionist, which implies that social properties are outcomes of the interactions between 
individuals, rather than phenomena ‘out there’ and separate from those involved in its 
construction (ibid). 
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Bryman (2008: 393-394) points out some of the main differences between the quantitative 
research and the qualitative that are relevant to my research: Qualitative researchers are seen 
as using words rather than numbers in the analysis of society. In qualitative research, the 
perspective of those being studied — what they see as important and significant — provides 
the point of orientation. It is often seen attuned to the unfolding of events over time and to the 
interconnection between the actions of participants of social settings. The approach is 
invariably unstructured, something that enhance the possibility of getting the actors’ 
meanings, and emerging concepts, out of the data collection. Whereas quantitative researchers 
want their findings to be generalizable to the relevant population, the qualitative researcher 
seeks an understanding of behavior, values, beliefs, and so on in terms of the context in which 
the research is conducted. Qualitative researchers claim that their contextual approach and 
their often-prolonged involvement in a setting engender rich data. 
When looking at these differences it becomes evident that my research project had to be based 
on qualitative research. I wanted to investigate actions of a loosely connected organization, in 
interaction with a quite unique setting, namely a revolution/civil war. A strict survey with a 
representative sample of the people of Libya would not have given much meaning, in my 
case. It is a relatively small group I want to investigate. Such an investigation should have a 
focus on words rather than numbers, and it is the perspectives, values and beliefs of my 
informants that are of interest to me. The situation that I am investigating is also not a static 
one, the revolution was an unfolding event and I seek to understand the group’s actions in that 
given event. Also, an unstructured approach seems needed, because I could not know every 
interesting aspect of my research before I conducted it. Such an unstructured approach helped 
me draw out new meanings and concepts while the research was ongoing. Furthermore, it is 
not mainly generalizable ‘truths’ I want to search for and find. I do not seek a general finding 
of how modern rebel groups relate to media issues during a conflict. Such a research project, 
if possible at all, would have taken far more resources. Rather, I primarily seek an 
understanding of behavior and beliefs of a particular group of people, in the exact context of 
the Libyan war. I believe that the choice of using a qualitative approach will generally give 
me a deeper insight and a richer data content than I could have gotten with quantitative 
approaches.  
The inference of the argument above makes it evident that one of the most fitting qualitative 
methods to use in this project is the interview. The qualitative research interview attempts “to 
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understand the world from the subjects’ point of view, to unfold the meaning of their 
experiences, to uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations” (Kvale, Brinkmann 
2009: 1). One form of the research interview— a “semi-structured interview”— is what I 
mainly will use. The researcher has a list of questions—or fairly specific topics—to be 
covered, but the interviewee has a great deal of freedom in how to reply. The interview 
process is flexible. The emphasis is on how the interviewee frames and understands issues 
and events, like what the interviewee views as important in explaining and understanding 
events, patterns and form of behavior (Bryman: 438). 
4.2 Research planning and trip to Libya 
In October I started to contact Norwegian journalists I knew had covered the war in Libya. I 
attended several lectures and conferences where the journalists were speaking. I told them 
about my project, to see if they thought the topic was something to dig deeper into. They 
thought so. I also wanted their views on the possibility of going to Libya at that point, about 
visa and security, and about potential contacts in the community I wanted to investigate. In 
November I finally got two central names from one of the journalists. I contacted them and 
received invitation to both Tripoli and Benghazi, and promises that they would set me in 
contact with everyone I needed. In the post-conflict chaos that Libya was in at the time, the 
visa system was not working effectively. I called and e-mailed embassies and potential 
helpers every day for almost two months. Eventually I got a journalist visa, after an editor in 
Verdens Gang (where I work part time) wrote a letter stating that I needed to go to Libya to 
work for the newspaper, even though this was not the purpose of the trip. It was basically 
impossible to enter the country as a student or researcher at the time. This did not lead to any 
problems during my data collection. My informants knew I was a researcher, not a journalist. 
Libya was in a very unstable post-conflict period at the time I planned my trip. The National 
Transitional Council and the interim government did not have much actual control or power, 
and an uncountable number of armed militias were in control of different parts of the country. 
The cities I wanted to visit were divided between different armed groups. The Norwegian 
Foreign Ministry advised all citizens not to travel. I read all possible news coming out of the 
country, and I talked extensively with journalists that just had been, or were, in Libya. I 
figured it was safe enough.  
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While I waited on the visa process I interviewed journalists that had covered the Libyan 
conflict. They were based in different places all over the world, like Rome, Amman, Bergen, 
Jerusalem and New York, thus, the interviews were conducted via Skype. I got in contact with 
them via e-mail and Facebook. They approved the project and wanted to speak their minds. 
As I was in London to pick up my visa, one of the most central NTC members was there. I 
met with him and got contact information to other people with central positions in the NTC 
Media Committee. From there I went to Benghazi in eastern Libya. Beforehand, I had 
maintained contact with informants via Facebook (where everyone is) to inform them about 
my plan. I spent the majority of my time in Benghazi, because most of my informants were 
based there. As I talked to one informant, I got several more important names. In a short 
period of time I had interviewed many central and highly relevant informants. When I was 
finished in Benghazi, I went to Tripoli to finish the interviews. I was in Libya from March 8th 
until March 21st, 2012. 
The security was a constant dilemma. I had a guide that picked me up at the airport in 
Benghazi and helped me for the first period of time. After a while I could manage my self. I 
was in one dangerous situation, when I attended and photographed a pro-federalist 
demonstration in Benghazi. An armed militia attacked the demonstration, panic spread, and I 
had to flee the shooting. One was killed and five were hurt in the incident. Except that— and 
aside from the amount of armed people in both cities—I felt relatively safe. 
4.3 Design/sample 
To the question about how many interview subjects that is needed, Kvale and Brinkman 
(2009: 113) claims that the answer is simple: “Interview as many subject as necessary to find 
out what you need to know.” The number of subjects necessary depends on the purpose of a 
study, but common interview studies tends to be around 15+/−10.  This number may be due to 
a combination of the time and resources available for the investigation and a “law of 
diminishing returns”. The argument is that beyond a certain point, adding more respondents 
will produce less and less new knowledge (ibid.). I believe I interviewed the amount of people 
needed to answer my research question, and I experienced diminishing amount of new facts 
and aspects towards the end of my data collection. My sample is naturally of purposive art; it 
is strategic and it is attempting to establish a good correspondence with the research question 
and the sampling. I used so-called snowball sampling, which Bryman describes as “a non-
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probability sample in which the researcher makes initial contact with a small group of people 
who are relevant for the research topic and then uses these to establish contacts with others” 
(Bryman: 699). I had two main contacts, which was highly central for my topic, and when I 
had interviewed them, they gave me more names and contact information. I made an 
assessment about the relevance of the names they proposed. I organized the interviewees into 
three categories: journalists, young activists, and the NTC leadership. The criteria I had for 
selecting the interviewee was that they were central actors in any of these three categories, 
and that they could shed relevant light on the topic and give me new information. It was also 
important that they had relatively different tasks during the conflict, so I could get as much 
nuance, width and insight as possible. 
I will now present my informants. This is important because before I present these 14 
people’s opinions and statements, it is essential for the reader to know who they are, why they 
are relevant, and what they represent. I will start with the journalists: I have conducted 
interviews with journalists with great experience from the Libyan conflict, journalists who 
dealt with the rebels extensively. They worked within different types of media, and have 
together reached out to media consumers in vast parts of the world. I believe they are highly 
able to illuminate the journalist side of the conflict. 
• Jørgen Lohne is the Middle East correspondent for the Norwegian newspaper 
Aftenposten. He covered the Arab Spring extensively during 2011, and entered eastern 
Libya soon after Benghazi had fallen into rebel hands. He was in the country several 
times during the conflict, also after the fall of Tripoli. 
• André Liohn is an award winning war photographer and cameraman that have 
covered several conflicts the last decade. In the beginning of the war he worked for the 
recognized German magazine Der Spiegel. He also worked for several other respected 
news organization such as The Guardian and CNN. Liohn was in the heavily 
bombarded city of Misrata while two of his colleagues, two news photographers, died 
covering the front line battle in the city.   
• Yama Wolusmal is a Norwegian war correspondent that covered the Libyan conflict 
for China’s international 24-hour television network, CCTV. They spent a great 
amount of resources on the conflict-coverage and Wolusmal made five trips to Libya 
during the conflict, from the beginning to the end. He also reported for Norwegian TV 
2. 
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• Stephen Farrell of the New York Times is an experienced foreign news journalist, 
and has been a war correspondent for the paper for several years. He have extensive 
knowledge of insurgencies, and have been kidnapped both by insurgents in Iraq and 
by the Taliban in Afghanistan. While covering the retreat of the Libyan rebels during 
the spring of 2011, Farrell and three other colleagues were captured and detained by 
Gaddafi loyalists. They went missing, and were held captured in Tripoli for six days. 
• Tony Birtley has been a war correspondent for 25 years and covered the Libyan 
conflict extensively for Al-Jazeera. He was in Sirte the day Gaddafi was captured and 
killed, and was the reporter that got the rebel mobile footage of Gaddafi being 
captured alive right before he was shot. The images and video spread rapidly all over 
the world. 
In the activist category I have interviewed informants that were central in the making and 
running of the daily work to help and influence journalists, mainly from Benghazi. They are a 
loosely connected group that worked with international media every day during the conflict. 
Together they worked broadly to bring the revolution forward. 
• Isha Aftaita and Lina Selbesh were the first people many journalists met in 
Benghazi on the day of arrival, as they were some of the leading figures in the 
downtown Media Centre. Among many tasks, they registered journalists and 
facilitated the services needed for making reporting easier. They worked voluntarily in 
the Media Centre during the greatest part of the eight month long conflict. 
• Suliman Ali Zway and Osama Alfitory used to work in the construction business, 
but as Benghazi fell they volunteered to help the many journalists arriving to the city. 
All the war through, they worked as drivers, translators and guides for some of the 
worlds most established foreign correspondents in papers like the New York Times 
and Washington Post. For their work they were recognized in London in November 
2011, as they received The Martin Adler Price. The price aims to give attention to 
local fixers that help international journalists during reporting. 
• Omar Amer is a Libyan that lived in Manchester, Britain, when the revolution 
started. He is the founder of an activist organization named Libyan Youth Movement, 
which, during the conflict, became on of the major voices of the Libyan people living 
outside the country. The movement worked as a news agency, intensively feeding 
international journalist with information during the conflict.  
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The informants in the third category were members of the NTC during the conflict, and they 
were the front figures in the Council’s daily media effort. They all had leading positions:  
• Mohammed Elkish was Head of the International Media Unit in the Media and 
Communication Committee (MCC) for the NTC. He was working with strategic 
communication, arranging press conferences, training members of the Council to 
handle media pressure, and such. After Tripoli had fallen into rebel hands he became 
the Head of the MCC. 
• Abdul Busin was Head of the Military Media unit, which entailed working with all 
the information about the rebels’ military effort, the situation on the ground, and in the 
front line. He was also a military spokesman informing the journalists, as well as 
NATO. 
• Hana Galal was one of the founding members of the NTC, which attended the first 
meeting of the Council, and was given the task to create the Media and 
Communication Committee. She later became the Minister of Education for the 
Council. She is educated in international law, from the University of Bern, and is a 
professor at the faculty of law in the University of Benghazi. 
• Jalal Galal was also an initial member of the NTC, and soon became the head 
spokesman for NTC. He held that position from the beginning of the revolution until 
January 2012. When journalists were given comments from the Council, it was mainly 
Galal’s task to handle it. 
4.4 Transcription and analysis 
The interviews in Libya were conducted in English, in different cafés and offices in Benghazi 
and Tripoli. Beforehand, I informed the interviewees about my project, how they were going 
to be used, and whom else I had interviewed. They all agreed to speak with their full name, 
and put no restrictions on me as a researcher. The interviews were recorded with an audio 
recorder, and transferred to a computer. They were transcribed the same day as they were 
conducted. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009:180) says transcribing interviews from an oral to a 
written mode structures the interview conversations in a form amenable to closer analysis, and 
is in itself an initial analytic process. I transcribed the interviews mostly as a working tool for 
me as a researcher. I used a formal, written style, and did not write down every single sound 
the informants made. I made this choice to make the transcriptions more effective to work 
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with. By transcribing the interviews at once I could start the analytical process early: As I 
transcribed I highlighted the most important sections of the interview, and filtered more easily 
out new and important information. 
Kvale and Brinkman (2009: 193) say the analysis of an interview is interspersed between the 
initial story told by the interviewee to the researcher, and the final story told by the researcher 
to the audience. To analyze means to separate something into parts or elements. After I 
returned to Norway I printed the transcripts and organized them into the three mentioned 
categories: Journalists, Activists and NTC-leaders. I read through every transcript in each 
category, and I found the main topics of the interviews. I made a list of categories like 
“organization”, “motivation”, “views on external support” etc., and gave each category a 
number. Then I read through the transcripts again, and numbered the statements and quotes in 
relation with the different topics. This helped me organize the extensive amount of text, and it 
made a proper analysis more manageable. The process of coding and categorization is a well-
used approach in social sciences. Coding involves “attaching one or more keywords to a text 
segment in order to permit later identification of a statement, whereas categorization entails a 
more systematic conceptualization of a statement” (ibid: 202). The goal is the development of 
categories that captures the fullness of the experiences and actions studied. When coding 
takes the form of categorization, the meaning of long interview statements is reduced to a few 
simple categories, and different phenomenon can occur. This method reduces and structures 
large interview texts, and can provide a much-needed overview (ibid). This was an important 
part for my work, and helped me find what I was looking for. 
4.5 Verification 
The importance and scope of this thesis must not be exaggerated. It is a student’s master’s 
thesis, and it is a work conduced with the available time and resources. Nevertheless, with this 
as a starting point, the research can still be useful and valuable. My research project can be 
seen as a small contribution to the far bigger picture. I add one carefully conducted piece of 
knowledge. Other researchers must continue to add pieces of information to further develop 
our knowledge about this field.   
There has been some academic discussion concerning the actual relevance of the terms 
reliability and validity in qualitative research. However, qualitative researchers have tended to 
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employ the terms in very similar ways to quantitative researchers when seeking to develop 
criteria for assessing research (Bryman: 377). I use LeCompte’s and Goetz’s (1982) 
interpretation of the terms, cited in Bryman (2008), as a framework when I assess my own 
research. 
• External reliability can be seen as the degree to which a study can be replicated. This 
is a difficult criterion to meet in qualitative research, since, as LeCompete and Goetz 
recognize, it is impossible to ‘freeze’ a social setting and the circumstances of an 
initial study to make it replicable. (Ibid: 376). My research in Libya was done in 
March 2012, at a point where the conflict was just over, and the participants I talked to 
were willing to contribute with information. The setting of the interviews at the given 
point in their post-conflict period may have been unique. Many factors may have 
changed since then. When that is said, I believe a majority of my informants would 
bring forward much of the same information if the same questions were asked by other 
researchers again. To make replication easier, and as a move towards transparency, I 
will attach my interview guides. 
• Internal reliability, as LeCompete and Goetz see it in relation to qualitative research, 
means whether, when there is more than one observer, members of the research team 
agrees about what they see and hear. This was not possible for me. I did the research 
on my own, I interviewed on my own, and I transcribed and analyzed on my own. To 
compensate, and to make sure I was not making up my own biased picture of the 
situation, I continuously talked to relevant actors about my research. For example, I 
talked to several journalists that were in Libya about my main conclusions and there 
is, as I see it, a consistency between my findings and the general impression of my 
research topic. 
• Internal validity: Validity is concerned with the integrity of the conclusions that are 
generated from a piece of research. The word trustworthiness is also applicable. 
Internal validity is concerned with whether there is a good match between researcher’s 
observations and the theoretical ideas they develop. It is about the credibility of the 
research (Bryman: 376). LeCompete and Goetz argue that internal validity tends to be 
a strength of qualitative research, because a deep and broad look into one case allows 
the researcher to ensure a high level of congruence between concepts and the 
information that is obtained. The issue of good internal validity in my case mainly has 
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to do with the relevance and positions of my informants, the quality of the interviews, 
and my ability to understand and analyze the collected data.  
• External validity: One question on which a great deal of discussion has been centered 
concerns the external validity or generalizability of a case study research such as my 
own. How can a single case possibly be representative so that it might yield findings 
that can be applied more generally to other cases? (Bryman: 55)  The answer, Bryman 
stresses, is that it cannot. External validity refers to the degree to which findings can 
be generalized across social settings, and may be a problem in qualitative research. 
My findings and conclusions on the Libyan rebel movement can, detailed and 
comprehensively, say something about that single case, but it cannot say much about 
rebel groups’ media efforts in general. I can suggest tendencies, and point out which 
directions further research should look, but it can only confirm aspects within the 
single case I have examined. 
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5 Results and analysis 
I will now present the results of my research. Because this is a presentation of a unique 
phenomenon and organization that has not yet been examined broadly, I believe a descriptive 
analysis of my findings is needed. New information will be seen in the light of existing 
literature and theory, and in that way the Libyan rebels’ actions can be connected to a broader 
academic picture. Firstly, I will present the journalists assessments of, and experiences with, 
the Libyan rebels. Their views are a crucial supplement to a critical evaluation. Secondly, I 
will present the efforts and believes of the young helpers and activists working to provide 
journalists with whatever they needed during the conflict. Finally, I will present the National 
Transitional Council’s media organizing, their motivations and efforts to influence 
international media to report in their favor. 
5.1 The journalists 
It is important to investigate the international journalist’s point of view, to see how they 
experienced and consider the rebels’ behavior towards them during the war. This thesis’ focus 
is the Libyan rebels, but interviews with the journalists are central supplements to what the 
rebels say and claim. In that way I can gain an insight into both perspectives, and thus get a 
better overview.  
In the light of what these journalists have told me, and the theories on insurgencies and news 
media, I will first discuss the rebels’ behavior towards journalists in the first phase of the 
conflict. Secondly, I will explain how the journalists assess the rebels’ media organizing, and 
thirdly, I will draw out what message and impression they wanted to give the journalists. 
Lastly, I will discuss what the journalists see as a change in behavior towards the media as the 
rebels got more power. Attempts on propaganda will also be discussed there.  
5.1.1 Rebels’ enthusiasm towards journalists 
As Clifford Bob writes, raising international awareness is a key to getting legitimacy and 
support. For many insurgencies this is the first obstacle, and the marketing of a rebellion often 
happens in a direct competition with its domestic foe. (Bob, 2005: 23). This was clearly the 
case of the Libyan rebel movement. Even though it was a loosely connected group, and it was 
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difficult to know who was a “rebel” and who was just supporters, one impression became 
clear as the journalist entered eastern Libya: They were highly welcome. Many of them 
entered Libya through the border from Egypt, and travelled west towards Benghazi from 
there. Along the road they were very popular. Guards welcomed the journalist warmly and 
waved them across the border. People even hailed them as heroes. Yama Wolusmal said the 
rebels hoped his team should drive straight to Benghazi to report on the fall of the city. He 
believes a reason for that is the importance of the city: 
“I believe a strong reason for the warm welcome was that many foreign journalists came to report on 
the fall of Benghazi, and this is a city with great symbolic importance for the rebels. It is the next 
biggest city and is traditionally known for its resistance against the Gaddafi regime during the 42 years 
of his rule. The fact that the rebels overthrew the dictator in this city was important for them. It was a 
great victory that they wanted the world society to see.”  
Tony Birtley in Al-Jazeera says that he felt he was some kind of a celebrity. “People greeted 
us and hugged us, and thanked us for being there. We found nothing but cooperation and help 
from these people”, he says. This is what Bob deliberates. If raising awareness is a key, 
journalists are naturally seen as a tool to create this awareness. Showing the victory in 
Benghazi can be seen as an important first step in the marketing of the rebellion. This showed 
that they were strong and ambitious. An overwhelming willingness to speak their minds to 
journalists was also clearly evident. As André Liohn puts it: “It was very interesting to see, 
because these people had not been able to speak freely in many years, and suddenly they had 
a huge international media-apparatus in front of them. Everyone had a story to tell, and they 
wanted to tell it all the time. It was important for them.” Others also point out that at once a 
journalist pulled out a camera people flocked in front of it.   
As said, in his critique of mainstream reporting from conflict zones, Johan Galtung argues 
that most reporting is violence oriented; it emphasize the visible forms of violence like 
killing, wounded and material damage. He also argues that journalists often are reactive, 
waiting for violence before reporting. Bob follow this logic by stating that violence often 
attracts media more effectively than peaceful events, and that some insurgencies’ strategy can 
be to create a political spectacle. Common forms are mass marches and violence. The key is 
to grab media attention and dramatically show the world what is going on. Without such 
spectacle, Bob argues, the likelihood of sustained and substantial media attention is small.  
After the first spectacular period had calmed down in Benghazi, the reporting of the frontline 
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battle began. Many journalists were eager to see the actual fighting against the regime. Also 
here the rebels showed willingness to help the journalists as much as they could. Rebels in the 
frontline offered to drive journalists for free, and give them free gasoline and food. Jørgen 
Lohne says that the rebels were evaluating the security threat in the frontline, and shipped in 
journalists when they though it was safe. He was himself driving out with the rebels, at one 
point. In the beginning of the conflict the rebels were very eager to have journalists in the 
fighting zone, reportedly they were polite and helpful, and guided the journalists straight into 
battle. André Liohn experienced how dangerous that could be. He was in Misrata when his 
colleagues, the photographers Tim Herington and Chris Hondros, died while following a 
media friendly rebel militia inside the city. Liohn himself came to the besieged city as a 
passenger on a small fishing boat, shipping in weapons to the rebels. He explains the 
willingness by the rebels to show their battle to journalists in this way: “I think they did it to 
show how difficult the fight was. Many of these men were ready to die in the fight against 
Gaddafi, and why should they not take journalists with them to show this deadly struggle?” 
One of the main reasons for the comprehensive willingness towards journalists, Wolusmal 
believes, is Al-Jazeera’s high standing in the Arabic public. The channel covered the Arab 
spring extensively, and had at most 16 teams inside Libya during the war. Al-Jazeera’s 
reporter, Tony Birtely, agree.  
“We are a huge network, and everyone in the Arab world watches the Arabic version. Al-Jazeera has 
challenged the norms in the Arab world, they have contested and confronted regimes like no other 
media organization. They have made some mistakes, indeed, but generally with these uprisings, they 
have told the story as it was. They have taken the message of the people and broadcasted it throughout 
the Arabic society.” 
5.1.2 Rebel media organization, seen by journalists 
The logic in Gitlin’s argument about the power of the media is that in lack of deep 
knowledge, for instance of what is happening in countries far away, people are pressed to rely 
on mass media for information about what is going on. People find themselves relying on the 
media for concepts, for images of their heroes, for guiding information, and so on. (Gitlin, 
2003: 1) If a group know about and understand this kind of media phenomenon, in this case 
the Libyan rebel movement, it can be a good enough reason to facilitate everything needed for 
journalists to make reporting possible. Bob’s research argues that insurgents are aware of 
power of international media, and use it, among other strategies, in the marketing of 
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themselves. Insurgents do nothing more, he says, than their opponents, like governments, 
multinational corporations or financial institutions, with huge resources and privileged access 
to international press. But with no big public relation machines to back them up, insurgents 
must “bootstrap themselves to the fore” (Bob, 2005:23) The rebels in Libya used the 
resources they could come up with.  
At the most dramatic periods of the war, nearly 600 journalists worked from Benghazi at the 
same time, and the hotels were so filled up that journalists sometimes had to share rooms. The 
informants experienced an intense organization from the rebel side to help journalists during 
the course of the conflict.  This will be far more comprehensively described in the next 
subchapters, but it can be fruitful to see it from the eyes of those affected, namely the 
journalists. 
It is important to remember that in Benghazi there were increasing amounts of young people 
that did not have anything to do during the conflict. “Every workplace and school was shut 
down, and not everyone dared going into the war. Because of this, many found work in the 
media sector of the rebel movement, in different media committees, writing reports and press 
statements”, says Liohn. Wolusmal recounts that in all of Benghazi, even though it was some 
kind of anarchy, it was a massive and positive spirit of voluntary work. Civil people took care 
of every basic service the city needed. This spirit also counted in the media sector. Many 
well-educated Libyans living in exile—either in Canada, Britain, U.S. and other countries—
poured in to Benghazi. “These were young people who were willing to make an effort, and 
they were the main driving force towards the press”, Wolusmal says.  Many of the tools 
journalists need were made available in a burnt out courthouse building. It turned into a media 
center. Voluntary businessmen were putting up satellite antennas and other equipment for 
communication, so that the journalist could get internet- and telephone connection. According 
to the informants this became the “place to be”, not only for journalists, but also for everyone 
that wanted to speak with the press and had a statement they wanted to express. What several 
observed was that the journalist that worked for the bigger networks, bigger channels and 
newspapers with greater resources, used the media center to a lesser degree than the hundreds 
of journalist working for smaller media outlets or freelance. Yama Wolusmal assesses it this 
way:  
“I saw very much uncritical use of these services, for example that the media center chose interpreters 
for the journalists, and those interpreters worked for free, and the media center fixed transportation, the 
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drivers worked for free. That said, what I think was really inappropriate by many journalists was that 
they let the rebels find “cases” for them. Journalists showed up in the center and said: “I need a family 
that have lost their son in the fight against Gaddafi”, and then the rebels found a family that fitted, and 
the journalist were driven out to them. It was so much uncritical use of the media center’s services”.  
It is important to distinguish this voluntary work done mostly by young activists, from the 
NTC-leadership’s media organization and handling. My informants naturally also had to 
relate to them during the months of conflict.  Their organization and effort will be described 
in a later subchapter, but the journalists’ assessments of their job are crucial for a proper 
overall impression. In the far beginning of the conflict, Jørgen Lohne comments, he and his 
colleagues thought of the leadership’s handling of the international media as amateurish. 
There were little press conferences and a general lack of information about both organization 
and political goals. Some leader figures randomly showed up in the lobbies of the journalist 
hotels, and gave some statements. This is also the impression of Birtley: “I felt that the NTC 
hierarchy handled the media completely wrong” he says, and continues: “They did not want 
to address certain issues, and they did not feel the need to address issues that came up. 
Because of this, rumors occurred”. Despite this, the situation improved rapidly as the conflict 
developed. The rebels got a spokesperson that usually worked as a lawyer, and it became 
increasingly more possible to find out who the rebels actually were. Press conferences were 
arranged, and the media center made e-mail lists so the journalists could get information 
every day about where the press conference was held, and who was going to give statements. 
This effort surprised the experienced journalists. Wolusmal says: 
“I was noticing how fast the rebels and their leadership realized the importance of handling media in a 
good manner. Remember that Libya was in war, the rebels stood before enormous challenges, it was a 
grave danger that Gaddafi’s men could storm Benghazi at any point, it was a lack of food, gasoline and 
other supplies, and in the middle of all this the leadership thought of media handling. That surprised 
me.”   
Wolusmal also noticed that these people were highly knowledgeable and savvy, many of them 
with high education in Western countries, and they knew the value of treating the media 
question carefully. “This was especially when the hotel in Benghazi were full of journalists”, 
he says. The media work was of course not flawless. When asked about the main difference 
between the Gaddafi regime’s media handling, compared to the rebels’, Jørgen Lohne 
assesses that the sitting regimes apparatus was more professional, and had better trained 
media spokesmen. 
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5.1.3 The rebels’ message to the journalists 
For an insurgency to succeed, legitimacy and support for the insurgents’ struggle can hardly 
be overestimated. As mentioned, Forest argues that insurgents are often weaker military than 
its powerful nation-state adversary, and their ability to mobilize support and raise awareness 
for their cause is vital. Simultaneously this is a fundamental vulnerability, if it not works.  The 
need for external support and legitimacy for the Libyan rebels was vital; Gaddafi’s forces 
pushed their rebellion back, and the rebels’ use of violence against the government had to be 
justified. As explained, the rebels got weapon support, bombardment support, and a high 
degree of support by the western public opinion. According to Bob’s theories about how 
insurgents can form their message to distant audiences in search for support, there are several 
tactics available. Insurgent groups tend to “simplify and universalize their conflicts, and 
demonize prominent opponents, embrace voguish rhetoric” as well as appeal to the sympathy 
of international actors. (Bob: 30) Bob says insurgents, as a first step, tend to strip their 
conflict of complexity and ambiguity, projecting a clear picture of an important struggle 
against a villainous foe. They also appeal to the universal picture of good guy versus bad guy, 
or underdog versus bully. The journalist informants saw this type of message clearly unfold in 
the rebel held areas. Many had a great need to tell the journalists how much they hated 
Gaddafi, and how gravely bad his regime had been, and “how everyone in Libya meant the 
same”. Some journalists see this as an effect of a people that finally could speak freely. They 
were obsessed with bringing forward the suffering of the Libyan people under the dictator’s 
rule. Jørgen Lohne says: 
“The main message was that this was a completely rotten and criminal regime that had to be spat out, 
and that this was a legitimate fight. (…) Unison from everyone I talked to was that this is a fight that 
has to be fought to the end, no matter what, even with great amount of casualties. (…) Many in the front 
line had a relatively fanatic message and said: “To sacrifice the life is an honor, we have no fear, we 
want battle!”  
This is a finding that Bob also have seen in earlier insurgencies. While they play on their 
repression, Bob says, they emphasize organization coherence and their courage, rather than 
their helplessness. Photographer Liohn stresses that the Libyan rebels’ message was even 
more simplistic than for insurgencies in many other countries. 
“If one goes to Kurdistan to visit PKK, to Afghanistan to visit Taliban, or to Spain to visit ETA or to 
Colombia to visit FARC, they all have a ‘political handbook’ that they follow. Taliban stress religion, 
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FARC have stressed communism, ETA have stressed Basque identity. In Libya it was easier; it was 
ordinary people that grabbed arms for one reason: “Gaddafi out!” Why “Gaddafi out”? There were 
many reasons. When a bomb from Gaddafi’s men kills your dad or your sister, the survivors of course 
want to stress that unfairness. I never felt that they tried to impose journalists with an ideology. It was a 
diverse group that cooperated with one aim: “Gaddafi out”. 
The second clear message after showing the massive hate against Gaddafi was to get the 
international community to act against him. The journalists’ impression is that the need for 
external support seemed crucial. Their message to journalists was that without aerial support 
to halt the regimes dominance in the air, the rebellion would be crushed and Benghazi would 
fall. Some said they wanted aerial support, but not “foreign boots on the ground”. The 
message of urgent need was even well organized in Benghazi during the first phase of the 
conflict. It became a tradition that every evening after prayer, people poured to protest in front 
of the media center for the air campaign case. They followed the international debate closely, 
and registered who was in favor of supporting them, and who was not. They quickly 
condemned Russia and China and embraced Great Britain, U.S. and France for the effort they 
lay down in diplomatic, political and military questions.  The rebels were very eager to stress 
who was a friend of the “free Libya”, and who were not. Farrell said that many rebels he 
spoke to was very media aware, and physically showed him casualties in hospitals, as an 
argument for demanding the west to begin air strikes “to cripple Gaddafi’s overwhelming air, 
sea and land military superiority”. Birtley confirms this: “They said they could not survive 
without external support. It was vital”, he says. Birtley was in Benghazi on the night the UN 
resolution was signed, and recounts that it was “like they had won the World Cup”. He was 
kissed and hugged all the time, and people held placates in front of the TV cameras saying 
“Thank you, Al-Jazeera” and “Thank you, Sarkozy”. 
It was also important for the rebels to stress that they actually were “the good guys”. They 
wanted to express that they were morally superior to the sitting regime, and to counter what 
Gaddafi’s media staff said about them being al-Qaida related bandits. Wolusmal assesses: 
“They expressed intensively that they were civilians that usually worked as dentists and engineers. This 
seemed important for them, also because they depended on giving a good impression about themselves; 
that they were a better alternative, more civilized and that they had democratic values. They hoped to 
persuade the international community to acknowledge the interim government.”    
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Even though these people may just say what actually is true, these forms of messages could 
be compared to the term white propaganda. It is usually close to accurate or even true, but is 
“presented in a manner that attempts to convince the audience that the sender is the good guy 
with the best ideas and political ideology”. (Jowett and O’Donnell, 1999: 6) White 
propaganda attempts to build credibility with the audience, in this case the western media 
consumers, and this credibility can become useful at some point in the future. Jørgen Lohne 
believes that someone in the leadership obviously talked together to make the narrative about 
their struggle as positive as possible, and point out that it is quite obvious that the rebels saw 
the presence of foreign journalist as an opportunity to present themselves in a proper way. 
“Everyone in a conflict situation will try to use journalists to paint a positive image, also 
rebels”, he says, and continues: “The clear cut stand they took against such a rotten regime 
helped to give the rebels a positive angle on their fight, seen from the western audiences 
view”. This strive for legitimacy will be discussed in the NTC-chapter. 
5.1.4 Hostility towards the media, and propaganda 
It is useful to recount Jowett and O’Donnel’s much sited definition: “Propaganda is the 
deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct 
behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.” One can 
say that the rebels’ desired intent was to be seen as the “good guys” and their fight to be seen 
as legitimate. They hoped the journalists would bring forward this view. I have earlier 
mentioned the white type of propaganda, but the black type is known as “the big lie”. 
According to Jowett and O’Donnel it is credited to a false source and spread lies, fabrications 
and deceptions.  Several of the journalist informants claim the rebels tried to manipulate 
information, and worked to deny journalists access to information. 
As the conflict went along the rebels were not always eager to have journalists along. This is 
something several of the informants point out. Before he was captured by Gaddafi troops, 
Stephen Farrell of the New York Times was covering the retreat of the rebels back towards 
east, as Gaddafi troops were advancing. He says that the rebels he followed were extremely 
“ill-trained and ignorant”. They wanted him there while they were advancing, but when they 
were retreating, they got very nervous and often they were threatened at gunpoint to put their 
cameras down. “They did not understand technology, and seemed to believe that even the 
smallest stills or video camera could transmit live images to satellites, thereby giving away 
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their position”, he says. They did not want their strategies to be reviled by journalists. This is 
something Tony Birtley understands. Certain networks were actually putting up their cameras 
in the front line while reporting live, and within minutes Gaddafi’s army began shelling and 
killing. “In a war zone you have a lot of inexperienced journalist running around, and some of 
them do not understand that their presence can be damaging”, Birtley says, and adds: 
“Every single military in the world want some control over the media. The British, the Americans, the 
Europeans, NATO and others, they only give you what they want, whether it is facilities or cooperation 
at certain times. Being a person that have covered many wars, and seen this up close and personal, I 
understand that the rebels felt the need to have some control in the situation.”  
During the course of the conflict the informants experienced a change of behavior within the 
rebel movement. As their power grew, they became more hostile towards journalists. 
Especially after the rebels had entered Tripoli, brought down Gaddafi’s political power, and 
sough to terminate the last pockets of resistance, the rebels were more difficult to work with. 
In the last fight for Sirte, many rebels that the journalists had met earlier in the conflict 
behaved more aggressively, edgy and critical towards the journalists. Wolusmal was even 
held at gunpoint at several occasions and was threatened to move away. They said they would 
shoot if he did not stop the interviewing of civilians from Gaddafi’s hometown. The rebels 
had shelled the city for weeks, and it was clearly important for them to have some control 
over the information about what was going on. André Liohn, who also was threatened by 
rebels, sees it like this: 
“Everyone in a conflict, no matter what, want the press to be there if they are victims of an oppressor. 
But when the rebels entered Sirte they were not the victims anymore. They had ruined the hospital 
totally with shelling, and it was difficult to work as a photographer. I believe it is like this: If you are a 
victim you want to speak out loud, but when you become powerful, and it doesn’t have to be much 
power, the press is not important anymore. The press is used when useful. Therefore it is important that 
the press doesn’t become an instrument for any parts in the conflict”      
Wolusmal agrees with Liohn’s argument: 
“I saw a clear change in behavior from the time when the rebels was not recognized, did not have 
political support, nor had the international community on their side. When they advanced on the 
battlefield, the attitude changed. The reason for this, we found out later, was that the rebel also stood 
behind many violations of human rights, like torture and mistreatment of those they saw as the enemy’s 
supporters.” 
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The CCTV and TV2 journalist Wolusmal experienced a complicated situation when reporting 
on the fight over Sirte. This story can explain how important the rebels saw the power of 
media coverage. He and other journalist stayed in an old school building that was transformed 
into a makeshift hospital. They slept and ate there, got supplies and electricity. Every day 
dead bodies came in, and Wolusmal always checked out the corpses, to see what kind of 
wounds they had suffered. Also dead Gaddafi loyalist came in, and when he looked through 
the body bags he saw that many of them were handcuffed and had bullet wounds in the back 
of their head. It looked like outright executions. Wolusmal said that his cameraman should 
film the reportedly evidence of war crimes. Doctors that previously had been helpful and kind 
ran up to the reporters, yelling, and told them to pack their equipment and leave. When they 
denied, the doctors became aggressive. The reporters depended on the facilities the school 
building gave them, and they faced a dilemma: Should they send the pictures of the 
executions and report on it, or should they not, and continue to stay on the school and still be 
friends with the rebel commanders? “Of course we took the difficult choice to send the 
footage, and move out”, Wolusmal says. 
Furthermore, efforts to deliver false information—clear-cut propaganda—were evident. 
Farrell experienced that rebel commanders made “wild unsubstantiated claims” and expected 
the journalists to report on it at once without checking the information properly. On one 
occasion they claimed to have captured a number of Gaddafi fighters and said they were held 
in custody. Even senior PR officials got quite irritated when Farrell refused to report this 
without seeing the prisoners. In the interview with Farrell, he said it would be useful to refer 
to an account written by his New York Times colleague Chrispoher J. Chivers. In the report 
he reviles an anti-Gaddafi doctor’s lie about a dead man being a well-paid mercenary. Chivers 
writes: “To cover war is often to wander a thicket of lies. And opportunists are ever trying to 
confuse you further. War is like any other form of politics: Many people out there do not 
speak to journalists, they try to speak through journalists” (Chivers: 2011). He points out that 
the anti-Gaddafi forces’ spokesmen in the NTC often did not particularly care about the truth 
during the conflict. He further claims: 
“For much of this year, a public win for the anti-Qaddafi forces was in one-upping the regime 
propaganda with propaganda of their own, each false assertion standing to be reproduced in a he-said-
she-said wrap-up that fed the daily cycles of news. Again and again the anti-Qaddafi forces made claims 
that later proved not just wrong, but baldly untrue. Think, for one line of these falsehoods, how many 
times opposition officials in Benghazi, their capital, said that the oil city of Brega had fallen, and that 
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rebels had it under their control, when in fact the Qaddafi soldiers there remained entrenched, and the 
rebels— disorganized, poorly led and often prone to pell-mell retreats — were still feeling their way 
clumsily down the road.” (Ibid) 
My informants confirm the impression Chivers have of the rebels’ lies. Birtley says he saw 
certain parts of the opposition’s infrastructure trying to mislead the media, especially in the 
early days of conflict there were “incredible rumors”, with no kind of proof, and many people 
were taking this information as truth. One such claim was rape as a systematic weapon of war 
by Gaddafi loyalists. This was even picked up by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, among 
others. “We could not find any proof of such raping. Amnesty International did a broad 
investigation in the cities were the raping should have taken place, they interview many 
women, and found no evidence”, Birtley says, and adds: “Some people did try to exploit the 
media. If you repeat some things often enough it almost become facts.” Chivers writes in his 
report about rebel propaganda, that in the short term, circulating falsehoods and exaggerating 
or concocting evidence might feel like a smart shortcut for those seeking support for their 
cause, but: 
“…in the long term, wartime statements that evaporate under scrutiny are corrosive, and can harm those 
who craft them. In Libya, they undermined the credibility of the transitional council and many of its 
supporters, like this doctor, who instead of reaping some benefit or marshaling sympathy for the anti-
Qaddafi cause demonstrated that even doctors could not always be relied upon, and that the dead were 
mere tools. 
5.1.5 Why the war was popular among journalists 
The Libyan civil war was a massively reported war, both in the Arabic countries but also all 
over the world. During the five trips Wolusmal made to Libya during the conflict, he did more 
live performances on TV than he had made during his five former years as an international 
reporter. Several believe some of the reason for this extraordinary interest is Gaddafi himself. 
He was a famous dictator in the West, and was a special case politically, diplomatically and 
historically. Ben Ali of Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt could not match his reputation. Also he 
chose to fight until the end, which increased the drama and interest. Another vital fact was 
that the Arab “world” as we knew it showed signs of collapsing, a news story that in itself 
was comprehensive. The opposition also gained control over eastern Libya very fast, and for 
journalists, the access to a story is a crucial key. “We had a human-interest story. Civilians 
was getting shelled and killed by their leaders, it is as massive story, and it would have been, 
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whether it was in Thailand, Burma, South America, anywhere”, Birtley says. He believes the 
Libyan conflict was special because it was a very early presence of the international 
community. “Usually, the further you go from Europe, the less interest there is for the story, 
unless your own people are very much involved”. In this case the West was heavily involved. 
Birtley also believe the rebels media campaign was helped forward by this crucial line of 
events: 
“If you get bloodshed, you get headlines. If you get headlines, you get notice. If you get notice 
governments must answer questions about how to relate to the situation. In this way the event builds it 
own momentum, and except from the Gulf war, the momentum in Libya grew faster than any other 
conflict I have covered.” 
 This is the logic of the CNN-effect, and it will be thoroughly discussed in the chapters ahead. 
5.2 Young helpers and activists 
This subchapter presents the work and beliefs of youth in Benghazi, and young Libyans living 
abroad, that actively and voluntarily helped journalists to report on the rebels’ revolutionary 
cause during the conflict. I have mapped the extent of their work, their organizing, their 
motivation and reasoning for doing what they did. I will firstly explain how the most 
comprehensive group, the activists in the Media Centre in Benghazi, carried out their work, 
before I do the same with one of the biggest groups of diasporas, the Libyan Youth 
Movement. Secondly, I will show these people’s motivation, and to what degree they believe 
their work was important for the revolutionary cause. Together, a presentation of these 
loosely connected groups of hundreds of people will help paint the picture of an intense effort 
to help and push international media during the conflict.  
5.2.1 Media Center – Organization and work 
As mentioned, a turning point in the early revolt came on the 20th of February when protesters 
managed to attack and siege the central military compound within Benghazi, the same time as 
the interior minister, and former Army officer, Abdel Fattah Younis defected with his security 
force. The defection turned the momentum around in eastern part of Libya, and was also a 
major propaganda victory for the rebels. The problem was that there were no international 
media in the city at the time. The first journalist to enter the liberated parts of Libya was 
48 
 
CNN’s Ben Wedeman, and he arrived in Benghazi on the 23rd of February. He was met by 
thousands of people shouting “CNN, CNN”. From then on, journalists poured into the city 
from the border of Egypt. An organized group was soon made to handle the amount of 
journalists wanting to report.  
Towards the end of February the head of a major English-speaking school in Benghazi 
noticed that the translators that randomly were helping journalists was not qualified enough. 
Their English was reportedly not good, and they translated wrong and misunderstood 
important aspects. As Isha Aftaita, one of the organizers, says, “It was not good for the image 
the rebels needed”. Because of this, the school manager started to call up all the teachers he 
had and said he needed oral examiners to come in. Around 300 people showed up to take the 
speaking tests, and to volunteer for translation. The score was up to 40, and they had to get 
better than 30 to pass the test. English teachers also signed up for the translating work. After 
this testing, the fresh team of media organizers had made a full list, a book of qualified 
translators in different languages. Both Japanese-, English-, French-, Italian-, Spanish-, 
Swedish-, and Russian-speaking Libyans stood ready to help journalists from different 
countries that had just arrived in Benghazi. During the testing the qualified translators was 
given a booklet of ten pages, of all the things they needed to know about the revolution, the 
way the organization saw it. They were told not to use the words “civil war” or “rebel”, 
because the words were seen as negative. “They had to have an understanding of what was 
going on, but still we wanted them to be neutral, not bias, in their translating”, says Aftaita. 
The translators also worked as drivers and guides to almost everything in Benghazi and the 
area around. A much used term for this is “fixer”. According to the informants, many 
journalists were highly dependent on the group’s staff in the beginning of the conflict. “Some 
of them could not move without us. A reason for that could be that it was difficult to know 
who to trust in the city at that time, and we had the whole trust thing going”, says Aftaita. 
At this point, in late February, the organization was working out of a totally burnt out 
courthouse in downtown Benghazi, with two chairs and a table, a scanner and a printer. Many 
called it “the oven” because it was burnt, but it was effectively cleaned and painted. Soon the 
complexity and volume of the office grew. They got a full photocopy machine, computers, 
wireless internet, electricity from a generator, computers, satellite phones, and electronic and 
printed databases of both fixers and journalists. People from the communication companies in 
Libya, experts in their fields, came together to work out a proper system. An engineer brought 
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up the internet system, which got the media center connected to the web. This was seen as 
vital for the group to work in the best possible way. Hundreds of people worked with different 
tasks at the media center; only the translators and drivers were near 500 in numbers. In the 
beginning the journalists got free SIM-cards, free transportation, free food, and free hotels. 
“They were spoiled”, says Aftaita. When journalists came to Benghazi they would have to 
show their passport and Press ID or some kind of proof that they were journalists. The center 
scanned their passports and got the journalists to fill out a complete application form with 
basic information, like where they were staying, address back home, full name, and so on. 
This information was filed, and the journalists got a stamped press card with a picture on it. 
From February to September the center registered about 3000 journalists. 
Many journalists wanted to travel to the front line to report on the rebels’ deadly fighting 
against Gaddafi’s troops. The Media Centre also arranged this to happen smoothly. They had 
direct contact with the Military Council and the NTC itself, and they received messages about 
where the front line would stop. Mostly, journalists were allowed to go 30 kilometers before 
that. Usually the rebels would not let them further, because they had some experiences with 
journalists that went missing. If that happened the center would have all the contact 
information to the journalists and to his or her local fixer, and they would try to find out 
where they were, and contact their embassies. Before going to the frontline the journalists 
received a letter that approved that “he or she was with us”, with all the information about the 
journalist, so rebel guards could let them through the barricades. The center also called 
commanders before the trip, to ask for allowance for journalists to go. But not everyone was 
welcome. Aftaita explains how the rebel media organization had control. 
“We had some agencies that we did not want in the front line. This was agencies from China and 
Russia, and we were skeptical because of the whole no-fly zone debate. We could not know whose side 
they were on, and we did not want anything coming against us. Sometimes they could take a story and 
go backwards with it.” 
As well as front line approval, the Media Centre also organized access to hospitals, training 
camps and prisons. Trips to the more complicated city Misrata were also arranged here. 
The majority of journalists had, as told, local fixers that could help them navigate in the best 
way in the conflict area. Two of them were Zway and Alfitory, and they help explain how it 
worked. The two ended up as fixers almost by accident. Friends and family had met reporters 
that needed help, and called them up. From translating it escalated to driving and guiding all 
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day long. As Zway puts it, “the journalists needed somebody to give them a lay of the land. I 
explained who were who, background, and history of Libya and Libyans. But I was not 
completely neutral of course”. Alfitory says that the reporters did not know much about 
Libya, and that he had to explain the reporters a lot. The first period they spoke to families 
and brigades around Benghazi, before they travelled to the frontline. Here the local fixers 
risked their lives to help the journalists. They went to Ajdabiya, Brega and Misrata, and got 
shot at by mortars and snipers. As Zway fled a shelling, he tried to get as many journalists as 
possible into his car, before they escaped.  
The most intense period in the center was March, April and May. As the summer came, with 
its stalemate and little progress, fewer journalists came to Benghazi. In the first months the 
Media Centre was a voluntarily project that was not under any other revolutionary umbrella. 
As the informants explain the center did not get NTC’s recognition at first, and they “did not 
show any particular interest to what the hundreds of youths did”. In May, NTC’s media 
committee approached the Media Centre and said they needed them to keep their work going. 
So from then on the center was organized directly under NTC. The ID-Cards changed to have 
an official NTC mark. “We needed to get things official, and they needed to keep things 
organized, so we cooperated”, says Lina Selbesh, one of the organizers.  
An important aspect is that almost everyone that worked to help the media did so voluntarily 
and therefore did not charge anything for their long time effort. This fact even became an 
issue for many journalist, because they wanted to pay to keep things right. Some journalists 
were unhappy about this situation. As an example the fixers Alfitory and Zway worked for 
free from February until December, all the time, with many different news organizations. 
Even though the big international news organizations wanted to pay, the two refused to 
receive money, and said: “If we can’t work for free for you, you must find someone else to 
work with”. Zway explain the strong principal issue like this: 
“It was important to do it for free, because we were helping a cause. If there was no media to help, I was 
going to fight. The fighters did not take any money for their job, so why should we? And culturally you 
do not take money from outsiders; you rather try to help them. In this case the outsiders even helped us. 
It was not right to take money. Not acceptable.” 
Aftaita in the media center also worked every day for seven months for free, until she went 
back to her job as a teacher, and she emphasize that she would have “given up years for this 
cause”. Her colleague Selbesh also stresses the cultural aspect. “Libyan custom does not 
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allow payment for helping foreigners, and we were volunteers, it was not a business for us”, 
she says. 
5.2.2 Diaspora activists: Organization 
The media organizations in Benghazi got help from abroad to spread the word of the uprising. 
Already on February 2nd, 2011, two weeks before the revolution started, an organization 
called Libyan Youth Movement (LYM) was formed. It was a group of well-educated Libyan 
friends living all over the world, who cooperated to be an informative online news service for 
anybody interested. Social media, such as Facebook and Twitter should be used as a tool. The 
founders had seen what had happened in Tunisia and Egypt and believed it was going to 
happen in Libya at any moment. Rumors said that 17th was going to be the date. Up until that 
day the organization did no get much attention, because few thought such an uprising could 
happen in Libya. As the revolution started the amount of interest increased radically, and they 
got thousands of followers online, almost over night. The two founders were splitting the 24 
hours a day in half, so that the one worked daytime in England, and the other worked daytime 
in Canada. The little gap of time where both were sleeping got covered by a Libyan youth 
living in Dubai. All the members had family and friends living in Libya, and before 
international journalists entered the country on February 22nd, it was a lack of news from 
within Benghazi. The organization tried to provide the world’s media organizations with 
information and news. They got news out in this way: The members had friends on the 
ground that had cell phones that went on and off. The signals were highly unstable, and only a 
couple of people in the whole city had satellite phones and working internet. LYM tried to 
call them all day long, to get through. They also smuggled satellite phones into the country 
from the Egypt border. People that took pictures and video sent it to them when the 
connection was working. Then LYM translated all the material from Arabic and sent it to 
news agencies. Libya was not in the headlines in the beginning, and the members of the 
organization believed that Gaddafi was going to use violence against the protesters in 
Benghazi. Founder Omar Amer says: 
“We needed to get news out in English. It was our duty. We translated and spoke to media organization 
in the western world. We had no choice but to be a news agency, because in the beginning no one was 
covering the story. The first pictures from Benghazi showed that people were celebrating the freedom of 
the city, and that tells you what had been going on before that freedom. We do not know how many 
died. We did a job that nobody else could.” 
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The international news organizations did not fully trust LYM in the beginning, and the 
founders were trying to convince the journalists to believe that the video and picture material 
actually was from Benghazi. In the beginning they provided a lot of information from a man 
named Mohammed Nabous, one of the most famous news providers based in Benghazi at the 
time. LYM contacted al-Jazeera, which did not dare to run the interview, because Nabous’ 
whereabouts could not be confirmed. CNN ran the interview soon after, and it is said to be 
one of the most circulated interviews from the time. Nabous was shot dead by a sniper shortly 
after, while trying to film Gaddafi’s attack on Benghazi. It was reportedly a frustrating time 
for the young activists. Amer tried to get the news out: 
“When I heard from my people inside Benghazi that the city had been liberated, which was crazy news, 
I phoned BBC and they did not believe me first. Then I did an interview on air with BBC World 
Service, and I was quick to say that ‘Benghazi had been liberated today’, and the host of the program 
quickly said that ‘BBC cannot confirm this, but if that is true you heard it here first’.” 
When picture evidence became more comprehensive, and the internet connections became 
stronger, pictures and videos started to flood from Benghazi. LYM gave all the material they 
obtained to the journalists, who used some of it for their articles and reportages. When al-
Jazeera first quoted them, they got a serious jump in their attention. Amer was on air for BBC 
at least 15 times during the spring. News agencies from all over the world contacted them. 
But Amer says that they had one problem in the beginning of the revolution: They were “very 
emotional, and pushed out every bit of information they got, without confirming the 
trustworthiness of it”. Some of it was even false news, and he understands that some news 
organizations were skeptical. “We were not journalists, but activists, and we were worried 
about our friends and family inside Libya”, he says. After a while they developed into only 
posting credible information. In that way they became more trusted by the media. The 
organization had a full database of people inside Libya, and they provided names and number 
to journalists. As Amer puts it, they “became an engine behind much of the reporting on 
Libya”. Soon the 21 members of LYM became one of the leading voices of Libya outside the 
country. On Twitter 52.000 people followed their updates, and 23.000 on Facebook. The 
organization tried to be a voice of Libyan youth, give the world a Libyan perspective on the 
conflict, feed journalists with information, and counter Gaddafi’s propaganda. They also 
provided front line news, and helped journalists inside Libya with information. 
53 
 
It is clear that raising international awareness was seen as crucial for these people, and this is 
what Bob says is an important key for many insurgencies. International media is vital to 
spread the word about the insurgencies’ activities, he says. According to him, as mentioned 
before, creating a political spectacle is one strategy, including mass demonstration and 
violence. Violent events often attract media more effectively than peaceful events. These 
attention-grabbing factors were highly present in Benghazi in the beginning of the uprising. 
Bob further claims that whether violent or nonviolent, the key is to grab media attention and 
“dramatically encapsulate the rebels’ identity grievances, and demands.” The young activists 
in Benghazi used this opportunity. They organized and worked intensively to bring forward 
the message of the revolution. 
5.2.3 Motivation and the belief in the power of media 
The young Libyan helpers and activists had a clear stated reason to work organized and 
comprehensive towards international media during the conflict in Libya. The following will 
present their views on the work they lay down, and the importance for a revolutionary 
movement to try to facilitate for, and influence, the media. Central here and later in the 
chapter about the members of NTC, is the so-called CNN-effect. As pointed out in the 
theoretical chapter, the phenomenon was much debated, after heavily communicated news 
events such as the fall of the Berlin wall and the Gulf war. After these events it has been 
discussed to what extent this media persuasiveness had influenced governments and the 
foreign policy making. The new technologies appeared to reduce the scope for calm 
deliberation over policy, forcing policy-makers to respond to whatever issue journalists 
focused on. The phrase ‘CNN effect’ encapsulated the idea that real-time communications 
technology could provoke major responses from domestic audiences and political elites to 
global events. One of the aspects of the CNN-effect discusses media as an agenda-setter. The 
argument says that emotional and compelling coverage of atrocities or humanitarian crises 
can reorder foreign policy priorities. Agents arguing for the “agenda-setting theory” argue 
that the choices and selections of national interests are too heavily weighted in favor of what 
happens to get covered by CNN or other media. The argument is that media, for a variety of 
commercial and professional reasons, is drawn to the dramatic visuals found in most 
humanitarian emergencies. As we will see, this is highly applicable in relation to what was 
going on in Libya.  
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Firstly: The reason why many young people in Benghazi ended up working with international 
media was an intense desire to volunteer for the revolutionary cause. Selbesh’s example is 
explanatory. She is an educated architect, and in the beginning of the revolution the doctors 
and nurses had something palpable to do, while there was little an architect could contribute 
with. They needed translators for the international media, and because of her good English the 
work was suitable. “Everyone was at the frontline and we were just sitting here. There were 
already enough women that made food for the fighters. We wanted to contribute”, she says. It 
was the need to do anything for the revolution that also drew her colleague Afthaita to the 
Media Centre. “I had an uncle that died during the Abu Selim prison massacre in 1996, and I 
have an uncle that is still missing. I was ‘close to home’ while working voluntarily for the 
revolution” she says. The fixer Zway explains how he came to understand how important it 
was to get the word out about what was going on.  
“When the rebellion started there was no one in Benghazi to report on it. At this point, before the war 
had really started, I believe journalism was even more important than weapons. We needed international 
support, and who else could get that message through than reporters? Gaddafi had his own propaganda, 
so we had to battle it. We had a whole region liberated, and we needed to get the word out.  
His colleague Alfitory had the same argument in an interview with British journalists as he 
got an award for his work:  
"In the beginning I had decided to fight with the rebels, as it was our duty to protect our city. But just 
for a moment, until I realized that to help the journalists would be a much better cause. Back in 
February there were a lot of people starting to fight but not many helping journalists." (Gunter 2011) 
To me he says “the revolution started with protest the 15th, and until the 20th we needed 
soldiers, officers, and the most important thing we needed was reporters to show what we had 
done. Half of the country was liberated”. 
All the informants stress the fact that there had been attempts on rebellion in Benghazi before, 
especially in 2006, but that the protests were brought down by Gaddafi’s regime even before 
the word had reached other cities. It did not reach out to a foreign public. Amer in the Libyan 
Youth Movement had a strategy to get the news of this uprising out. One of the first days of 
protests, BBC Arabic called him for news. He sent them a video of a demonstration at the 
Egyptian border, and then a video of a demonstration on the Tunisian border. He said to them: 
“Please, put both of these videos on air, because people in Libya can still watch BBC Arabic, 
and if they could see people protesting on either side of the country, they would understand 
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that this is not an isolated happening. The whole country is in revolt”. They aired the video 
footage and played it again and again. The youths say international media gave the Libyan 
people a voice they never had had before. Many of them add that the media also worked as a 
safeguard for the people in Benghazi. Selbesh says: 
“For the past 42 years it has been attempts on revolution, to do something against the regime, but we 
have been disconnected to the world, and we could not get our story across. For this revolution the 
media was a key. (…) If no one heard about what was going on in Libya, Gaddafi could have just killed 
us all. But now the world was able to hear our voice and see what Gaddafi was doing to us” 
Because of this experience Selbesh and her friends have started an organization called 
Independent Libyan Media that fight for free media. They believe awareness and 
communication with the world is essential, and that free media can work as a safeguard for 
new dictators taking power and abusing its people. 
While the awareness of the importance of news made these young people go into the media 
related work, rather than fighting, the belief in the power of media increased as the revolution 
proceeded. They saw that the daily reporting from Tunisia and Egypt, showing masses of 
people demonstrating, made Libyans understand that it was possible to do revolt. Many of 
them actually believe that without the presence of international media in Libya, the revolution 
would hardly have succeeded. Amer says: “Libya was at war, but it was a psychological war, 
as much as a physical one. The media was a major weapon in this war. In the end I believe we 
won all possible wars”. Aftaita believes it would have succeeded in the end, but that it could 
have ended up like the humanitarian catastrophe we saw in Syria during the spring of 2012. 
She thinks that the media work was not vital alone, but a part of a successful mix. “It was 
connected all together, not just us. If one chain were missing it would not be as strong as it 
was. Many did more important work, but we did what we could”, she says. The CNN-effect 
comes in here. Amer in LYM does of course not mention the term “CNN-effect” but his 
argument follows the same logic. The argument strongly shows in what way the youth, 
through systematic media influence, could save the Libyan revolution: 
“A few days before the UN resolution was signed, the BBC called me and asked me for some news, and 
they said, ‘you guys in the Libyan Youth Movement get the news out 24 hours before the news hours’. I 
was thrilled, because we were unpaid students. We provided awareness for all kinds of news 
organizations, and it was the news organization that drummed up all the support for the UN resolution, 
because they showed what Gaddafi was doing. I believe that had we not been able to do that, the news 
organizations would not have put that particular attention to Libya, because at that point Bahrain was 
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going through their revolution, Egypt was in a mess, Syria was starting, and Yemen was getting a lot of 
attention. (…) We drummed up the news organizations, and they got news out, and the ministers in the 
western countries became involved, and it became the story at the time. We got headlines.”  
Amer’s argument is an important indicator of the underlying motivation many of these young 
people had when they started to work intensely toward journalists. They believed in a direct 
connection between media attention and political action, they believe their and the journalists 
work influenced the UN resolution in their favor. As we will see later on, this argument will 
be further emphasized in the chapter about NTC members and their media work. 
5.2.4 The activists’ message 
According to Kiras, insurgents often seek to legitimize their use of violence and translate this 
into meaningful support for their cause, by demonstrating moral superiority over those who 
represent the state. In this case the representative of the state was Gaddafi. Moral superiority 
for the insurgents is a cornerstone of all irregular fighting theory, Kiras says. To show that the 
insurgency in Libya was a fight by the people, by civilians, against a brutal dictator, seemed 
crucial to express. It was all about legitimacy. They wanted to get their struggle to be 
understood by the political leadership in the international community, but also by the general 
public of the world. There was an ongoing debate about who the rebels actually were, and 
what their motives were. Gaddafi’s propaganda apparatus tried to tell the world that the rebels 
were al-Qaida-connected criminals. The youth wanted to counter these claims. A quote by 
Aftaita sums up much of what my informants wanted to express to reporters in the beginning 
of the uprising: “Firstly, many thought we were like thugs and terrorists, but we were normal 
people (…) We just want to live our lives, we are up to date on fashion and technology, we 
are open minded and have a modern mix of religion and culture”. Selbesh also found it 
frustrating that some journalists were expecting only to find rebels with guns. She wanted to 
express that this was a peoples’ revolution, and that “all Libyans” were working for this 
uprising. “We only wanted freedom, and that this man did not kill us”, she says. As a fixer, 
Zway wanted to guide the journalists he helped to answer the questions everyone was trying 
to answer: Who are the rebels? “I tried to show that it really was a revolution, and that 
everybody was a rebel, so it was difficult to define the group. I think this guiding helped”, he 
says. For this group of young Libyans it was important to get their own moderate and modern 
opinions heard and publicized, so that people around the world could understand their desire 
for freedom from the regime. To express and show a similarity between them and people in 
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the western world was a simple and effective way of reaching out of support. And as we 
know, it worked: For example, 70 percent of the Norwegian public backed the military efforts 
against Gaddafi’s regime. The young revolutionaries gained sympathy. 
5.3 National Transitional Council 
The development of an overarching governing council for the Libyan revolutionaries occurred 
towards the end of February 2011. Former regime officials and recently returned expatriates 
formed a movement of political leadership, and after meetings in Benghazi and several other 
cities, the National Transitional Council’s announcement of the new political formation was 
made in early March. Support and legitimacy from the world community was essential for the 
new organization. This chapter seeks to discuss and explain three different aspects: Firstly, in 
what way the new organization was working to handle the international journalists coming to 
report on the insurgency—how the media group organized themselves during the eight month 
long fight. Again a descriptive analysis is needed. Secondly, I will look into the NTC 
members view on the importance of external support for their revolution. It is important to 
emphasize these views, to understand why they saw journalist as a crucial tool: Through 
journalists they could get international help. I will here also look into what message the NTC 
members wanted to convey through to international journalist. Thirdly, I will discuss how the 
Council used propaganda as a tool, and how they reacted to atrocities on the rebel side. 
5.3.1 An emerging organization 
In the beginning of the revolution there was no organization. Benghazi was in rebel hands, 
and the scene was chaotic. No international journalists had arrived. On February 17th Hana 
Galal went to the burnt out courthouse, and people started to give here mobile phones so she 
could talk to journalists. Because of the uncertainty of the situation, she did not give the 
reporters her name. After the first few days they saw that the rebellion grew, and the activists 
at the courthouse understood that they needed to get organized. Galal founded something 
called the “Media and Humanitarian committee”. At the time there were a number of different 
committees with different objectives. They worked as a coalition of volunteers. The groups 
were translating, talking with journalists via phones, collected documentation, and tried to get 
people on the roof of the courthouse to get internet connection. The regime tried to cut and 
shut down both internet and phone connections, so an alternative method was to bring the 
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documenting material by car to the border of Egypt, and get people to publish it from there. 
After the first week Galal was taking part in the formation of the NTC. At first, the leadership 
of NTC did not have a plan concerning media handling, and in the beginning they reportedly 
did not give much attention to the importance of media. Mohammed Elkish and a group of his 
friends gave the leadership of NTC a presentation of a potential media structure for the 
organization.  
“We told them that communication is important in such a war. The main goal should be to transfer a 
transparent picture about what was happening on the ground, letting the world know what is going on in 
Libya. (…) We said that the leaders needed to bring forward a clear message that could be reported, to 
show what they are after, and show the suffering of the people. Gaddafi had his own media, and they 
were very good at propaganda, so we thought: Let’s give him a battle’. In the end the leadership of the 
NTC was convinced.”   
From then on the Media and Communication Committee was formed. They had an 
international media unit, a military media unit, a social media unit, a local media unit, and a 
print and digital section. Each unit had its hierarchy and its own team. They also had a group 
they called “Media Influence Team”. I will come back to that under the propaganda section. 
In all 35-40 persons worked in the committee. Much of the committee’s job was to help the 
rebel leadership with media handling. They corrected the mistakes they did, and came up with 
advice. Sometimes they abstained from translating aspects in documents they knew would be 
bad marketing for the rebellion. They arranged press conferences and put people in the front 
that they knew would express the revolutionaries point in a best manner. “We were cleaning 
up the mess. We were strong revolutionaries committed for the revolution to succeed”, says 
Mrs. Galal. The committee had a morning meeting every day, where the heads of the different 
units attended. They discussed events from the day before, and what would happen the 
present they, if they knew. They strategized and planned. The different units had different 
tasks: 
• The Social media unit was the biggest, with about 20 people. They used Facebook, 
Twitter and YouTube to push news and messages about the rebellion. They also 
monitored the international media, and made a report for the committee members 
every day. Primarily, they reported on how Gaddafi’s propaganda had been used by 
international media, but also what aspects should be focused on, and pushed further to 
journalists. Also, if mistakes were made in the media, the committee would call the 
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actual media organization and say that, for example, the number of casualties they 
reported was wrong. 
• The Military media unit worked to give reporters information about how the military 
conflict proceeded. The frontline moved often, and the unreliable information about 
the fight was something the journalists were unhappy about. The unit worked from the 
military operational center in Benghazi, and they had direct contact with the 
commanders in the front line. The Head of the unit, Busin, says it was difficult to get 
all information right. Sometimes he physically drove out to the scene of a given event, 
talked to rebel soldiers and witnesses, and passed the information to journalists. He 
also claims that the unit had spies inside Tripoli that fed them with information that 
was passed on to journalists. 
• The International media unit was primarily dealing with, and briefing, international 
journalists during the conflict. It was this unit that embraced the so-called Media 
Centre described in the previous subchapter. The youth was placed under this unit as it 
became apart of the NTC hierarchy. Dealing with registration, press passes, and 
authorization to go different places was a part of their job. One of the main tasks was 
the press conferences. They were usually arranged in the hotels where the journalists 
lived. The head of the unit, Mohammed Elkish, says he treated the conferences like a 
marketing event. He was mainly doing sales and marketing events before he became a 
part of the revolutionary movement. “I considered NTC as a customer and they 
wanted a perfect press conference. I made sure I had the new Libyan flag, and that all 
journalists were invited. It was a marketing event”, he says. In front of the press 
conferences the people higher up in the hierarchy, like the vice-president and president 
of the NTC, was briefed and informed by the staff, before they went out to the 
journalists. 
• The head spokesman role was to take part in the committee’s work, continually try to 
have an overview of the situation, do interviews, arrange interviews with the frontline 
staff, counter ‘false’ news, and participate in the international news organizations’ live 
shows as a representative of NTC. At the same time Jalal Galal also saw it as his task 
to lift morale and eliminate fear in the population of Libya. “We did not have time to 
evaluate if we were as effective as we could be. We had to proceed, proceed and 
proceed”, he says. 
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The committee members worked from morning to night, and they say international journalists 
called 24 hours a day. After Tripoli fell in August, the committee moved together with the rest 
of NTC to the capital, where they continued working in the same way. 
5.3.2 Views on legitimacy and support in relation to media 
Insurgents are able to achieve success by gaining an advantage in terms of four main essential 
dimensions: time, space, legitimacy and support. The two latter is of particular interest to this 
thesis. Kiras claims few insurgencies survive without some form of support. Support 
however, is interlinked with, and inseparable from, the legitimacy of the organization, 
because violence conducted without a comprehensible political purpose will generate little 
popular support. The revolutionaries in Libya knew this. The young activists’ emphasis on the 
importance of external help, and therefore journalistic reporting as a tool, coincides with the 
views of my informants in the NTC. They see a direct link between influencing the media and 
getting legitimacy and external support. To get the argument right, I will firstly show the 
revolutionaries desire for legitimacy and external support, before I show how they worked to 
achieve these two important dimensions. 
Jalal Galal’s argument serves as an example. His greatest goal as a spokesman was to get 
support from the international community.   
“We needed help, and we needed help desperately, now, and promptly, because many men were falling 
every hour. We were very aware that Gaddafi would go to any length to destroy this uprising. (…) If 
journalists could not convince the international community to pass a resolution that was strong enough, 
and to act decisively, our revolution would have been stifled.  Luckily journalists did their job, luckily, 
on the 17th of March a very tough resolution was passed. From passing the resolution to actually carry 
out military actions was not more than 36 hours. It was historic and necessary, because if it was not for 
the resolution we would probably not look at Benghazi as we do now. From then on, Benghazi had a 
protectorate in the international community.”  
This argument is supported from the other informants. Abdul Busin believes that the 
international community saw what Gaddafi did against his own people, and that they would 
have been killed if they had not gotten any help. “If he had managed to take back the country, 
I can assure you that I would not have been sitting here today, as well as thousands of others”, 
he says. Busin was one of NATO’s first contacts in Libya, already in February, and is thus a 
first hand source on what kinds of external support the rebels wanted. He said they did not 
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want foreign soldiers on the ground, because they have seen what complications that has 
caused in Afghanistan and Iraq. “We did not need soldiers. We had the men to carry out 
operations, not with much experience, but with much courage. We rather needed weapons in 
our hands” he says and continues: “I told NATO to send us weapons, so we had the means to 
defend ourselves. Unfortunately complications in international law made this difficult. But the 
air campaign certainly helped”. As earlier described, both Qatar and several other countries 
gave the rebel movement weapons after a while. Dr. Hana Galal was one of the people in 
NTC that worked most focused with getting a UN resolution through. “For 42 years Gaddafi 
had spent our money on weapons. He had declared war against his own people. We had all 
rights to ask for external help. We had been treated with violence and atrocities”, she says. 
So how did these people try to drum up the attention they needed to get the support and 
legitimacy they wanted? Journalists were seen as one of the best tools. Spokesman Galal says 
their options were limited, and that they had few alternative things to do. They saw that with 
the international journalists the world could live with the people of Libya day by day. “We 
did not think of all the journalists as a power we could use, but rather a salvation”, he says. To 
get the message through, Mr. Galal, as a spokesman, tried to portray the “dangers, the 
brutality, the fear, and the expectations the people had”. “The smartest thing to do in such a 
situation, I think, is to let your emotions show through, and I did. I think we succeeded”, he 
says. Hana Galal used the same strategy. She wanted the average person in the international 
community to feel the Libyan people’s fear. In an interview with the BBC she tried to explain 
her situation, and used the fact that she was a mother of two as an emotional tool. She says “it 
was genuine, a human being talking to a human being”. These kinds of desperate messages 
were believed to build sympathy and legitimacy for the rebel movement’s cause. Many of the 
informants are arguing that they worked like this—hard and carefully—to give a good 
impression of themselves to the world. This was important because the Libyan opposition had 
changed from being non-violent civilians, to pick up arms and use violence to attack 
Gaddafi’s army. They had become armed insurgents, and needed a good argument to explain 
their actions to the international community, from whom they needed support. The head of the 
military media unit, Busin, says it was “kill or be killed”, and that they did not have an option 
but to defend themselves with weapons.  
“The happenings on 19th of March sent a clear message to the world. Gaddafi’s army sent missiles 
randomly in to the city of Benghazi, like we have seen in Homs, Syria. It was random and it killed 
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many. That gave us even more legitimacy to pick up even more arms, and to fight back even harder. His 
atrocities gave us a better cause.” 
This coincides with what Kiras writes about insurgents often seeking to legitimize their use of 
violence and translating this into meaningful support for their cause. Government brutality 
also as Kiras sees it “allows insurgents to act as the avengers of the people, helping to cement 
the ties between them”. It was also important for the NTC members to show who they were, 
and therefore counter Gaddafi’s claims of them being thugs and terrorists. This could also 
help to build legitimacy. Hana Galal wanted to express to the world, through journalists, that 
this was a peoples’ revolution, and that the people only wanted freedom and dignity. In 
interviews she strived for legitimacy by telling reporters that “we do not have an ideology or 
agenda, a certain group does not push our actions, and we are not al-Qaida. We just want what 
everyone in the world is fighting for: Dignity and human rights. We want to be a part of the 
world community, have a civil state, rule of law, and separation of powers”. Galal told this in 
almost every single interview she had. She also adapted her language to different countries in 
the world, to get an even greater amount of understanding and legitimacy. To the French TV 
channels she used the revolutionary terms ‘liberté’ and ‘fraternité’, to the American channels 
she spoke about the importance of a modern constitution like the American, and to the 
German channels she used terms like ‘freiheit’. While being able to speak to a big world 
audience, she knew that she possessed power, but that “media was a weapon of two sides. 
What you say can be misused and misinterpreted and then you can take the whole revolution 
in a wrong direction”. Busin says that the promotion of NTC as a well-organized and 
legitimate organization was one of the media committee’s greatest tasks. He understands that 
leaders in the west were afraid of doing what they have done wrong before: Arming and 
supporting groups that would go against them later on. He uses the American armament of the 
Mujahideen in Afghanistan against the Soviets in 1980’s, as an example: “We had to show the 
world who we were, that we were in control and were not trigger-happy terrorists that wanted 
to take over the world”. 
5.3.3 The motivation for a comprehensive media effort 
Gitlin argues, as mentioned, that of all the institution of daily life, “media specializes in 
orchestrating everyday consciousness, by virtue of their persuasiveness, their accessibility and 
their centralized symbolic capacity”. Further, he argues that media “directly and indirectly, 
with pictures and words, produce fields of definition and association”. In lack of other types 
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of information, the journalists thus become powerful. For example, in relation to a war, the 
media can have an unknown amount of power to create the public picture and shape the 
audience beliefs about what is going on. The people working to influence the media during 
the revolution in Libya knew what power the thousands of journalists coming to Benghazi 
had. If NTC were able to influence the journalists as a group, they could form public opinion 
about their revolution throughout the world. As the CNN-effect argues, such pressure can 
influence politicians and leaders, and create foreign policy. Governments can be pushed into 
political actions. What follows next is a collection of quotes that shows the awareness and 
mindset of the revolutionaries. They thought their work could influence the media, which 
again could influence the international community to act in their favor. 
To understand these peoples’ motivation and effort, it is important to map what importance 
they gave the media for the success of the revolution. A usual question I asked the informants 
was: “Do you believe the revolution would have succeeded without all the journalists being in 
Libya to report?” The answers was very unanimous, and in line with the logic of the CNN-
effect. “The revolution could have succeeded”, Busin says,  
“but it would have been a lot harder. Because the only way the international community could have 
helped us, and provided the weapons that we needed, was to create enough media hype about it. Had the 
world not seen or heard us, then we may not have received weapons and support. It would have made it 
difficult.” 
Head of the International Media Unit, Mohammed Elkish, saw the conflict as multisided. He 
believes he and his colleagues were soldiers fighting in another type of war, with other 
methods. 
“There was the war, the battle with guns and tanks, and there was another war, which was the Media 
War. Someone had to fight in the Media War, and we did. The journalists were definitely a weapon in 
this war, a good weapon, because they told the truth.” He continues: “The success of this revolution I 
owe to two: First is God. Second is the journalist. If it wasn’t for the journalists, who knows what 
would have happened here?” 
Elkish therefore believes journalists, without doubt, were important to raise the political 
discussion about the UN resolution. He confirms that this was well thought through by the 
revolutionaries. Elkish used to work in sales and marketing for 13 years, and says his job 
during the war was all about marketing. “Basically we sold the revolution to the world”, he 
says. He claims that he used something called “Red Ocean Strategy” in marketing theory. 
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Here, companies try to outperform their rivals to grab a greater share of product or service 
demand. (Insead.edu) “I based my strategy mainly on competition, on competing with 
Gaddafi’s guys. We made sure we spoke to journalists individually, and during press 
conferences. We though that the more journalists we spoke to, the better the strategy was”, he 
says. On a direct question to his colleague Busin, if the NTC saw the journalists as a helpful 
revolutionary tool, he answers straight forward: 
“Yes, extremely. We branded Libya to the world, and we created the image the world saw throughout 
the war. The world never knew what Libya was before the revolution. Most people had no interest. We 
put Libya on the map with a bang. Now, everybody knows about Libya and who Libyans are”. 
Dr. Hana Galal’s greatest goal was to affect public opinion, through journalists, which could 
pressure their governments to vote for a decision in the UN. “We had to mobilize the western 
world, it was very important”, she says. Spokesman Galal will not credit any particular groups 
for the victory of the Libyan insurgency, and he emphasizes that the spontaneity of the 
revolution was overwhelming. “Those we owe the most, is the fighters actually carrying out 
the victory”, he says, and continues: “Everybody did their bit, the best way they knew how, 
also the media workers. Was it important? I think so. Did it make a difference? I hope so. The 
media served as a voice against a tyrant. When that is said, this is not something to take glory 
out of. We needed to do this.” 
5.3.4 Propaganda efforts 
The revolutionary movement NTC used both propaganda and psychological operations in the 
war against the regime. Some of it is discussed in the journalist chapter. Some new 
information will be presented here. The informants will also explain why they think many 
rebels changed their attitude towards journalists in the end of the conflict. Atrocities from the 
rebel side made the strive for legitimacy difficult for the Media Committee, and media 
attention turned against them. As mentioned earlier, propaganda can be defined as “the 
deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions and direct behavior 
to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist”. It is closely related 
to the term psychological operations (PSYOPS), which can be defined as efforts “to convey 
selected truthful information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, 
motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of their governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals”.  
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The journalists I have interviewed mention attempts on propaganda, but it is important to 
have in mind the fragmented nature of the Libyan rebellion. The NTC did not have power or 
control over several of the connected rebel militias in the country. Much of the propaganda 
conveyed by the rebels was therefore out of NTC’s hands, and not a part of their plan or 
strategy. That said, NTC also used propaganda, which is confirmed by several of my 
informants. Particularly one specific strategy is revealed: They planted false rumors to the 
journalists, as a communication strategy towards the enemy. The head of Military media unit, 
Abdul Busin, a man that talked to journalists all day long during the conflict, says: 
“We tried to create our own propaganda, to counter Gaddafi. Some things were said that may not have 
been completely true, and we let it flow so the other side could think the rumors were true. We were 
using that kind of propaganda to pass messages to them, to spread false rumors. For example one of the 
rumors we put out was that we had hundreds of soldiers inside Tripoli, and that they were ready to 
attack on our command. That caused a little scare over there. We sent such stories to journalists, and 
they reported on it, and the other side responded. We were in dialog all the time via the media.” 
Mohammed Elkish, the person that arranged the press conferences and was in charge of 
dealing with international journalists, also confirms this kind of propaganda. Several times 
they amplified numbers of troops, and they were careful to do it when journalists were not 
able to confirm the facts: 
“We did a lot of propaganda to scare the Gaddafi side, like amplifying the numbers of troops in the 
frontline. Once we had 14.000 troops in the frontline of Ajdabiya, but we said we had 200.000. We said 
so via live interviews, so the journalists could not do anything about it, since it was live. The point was 
to scare Gaddafi’s troops, and I think it worked.”  
Also messages about advances in the frontline, and the whereabouts of Gaddafi after the fall 
of Tripoli, were sat out to trigger different reactions in the enemy’s lines. Also interesting is 
that an organized “Media Influence Team” was made by the NTC. This group is important to 
emphasize in this specific discussion, because their objective serves as an example of a 
typical PSYOPS. Their objective was “to reach the heart of the world”. For example, if there 
were a photo or a video of a young injured boy, the group would “add some effects with 
touching music and stuff”. Elkish says: “We did not change the truth or facts; we just 
transformed it into something better and bigger, something more effective that would reach 
the heart of the world”. This adds up to PSYOPS that “conveys selected truthful information 
and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions”. It also adds up with the 
definition of white propaganda: “Even though it is close to the truth it is presented in a matter 
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that attempts to convince the audience that the sender is the good guy with the best ideas and 
political ideology.”  
The spokesman Galal says that, even though they tried to use propaganda, they mainly 
counted on the international media to report on their successes to scare Gaddafi’s lines, while 
at the same time hoping the journalists falsified his propaganda. Galal also emphasize that 
propaganda was important for internal use, towards the population of Libya. They put up 
radio stations with local messages, like “It’s all of Libya against one tyrant”. Galal believe 
such radio stations were powerful, and in great favor of the revolutionaries. Internal popular 
support is, as discussed earlier, vital for an insurgency to succeed. Such support can be 
everything from providing information, intelligence, shelter, hiding places for arms and 
equipment, to the denying of such help to the enemy. To attempt to carry out an insurgency 
without the population’s support can be disastrous.  
Closely connected with propaganda is the effort to stop reporters from reporting truthfully on 
issues. As mentioned earlier, many rebels change their behavior towards journalists during the 
course of the conflict. As their power grew, they became more hostile and skeptical about 
having journalists around. Two of my journalist informants were even threatened at gunpoint 
because of their reporting. For example rebels said to Yama Wolusmal, as mentioned before, 
that they would shoot if he did not stop the interviewing of civilians from Gaddafi’s 
hometown. At the same time reports came from Human Rights Watch and other organization 
about atrocities like torture and executions conveyed by rebels. This was a problem for the 
Media Committee of the NTC, which attempted to make the rebels look as good as possible. 
At this point Gaddafi’s regime had fallen, and NTC were in power. The international 
journalists, who earlier in the conflict had helped the rebels to get the word about the 
revolution out, had now turned their critical focus towards them. NTC’s own human rights 
expert, Hana Galal, says the wrongdoings by rebels were a problem for them. She emphasize 
that NTC tried to be open in the beginning of the conflict, letting Human Rights Watch and 
International Red Cross see all their prisons and camps. She tries to explain the atrocities with 
the history of the country and the war. “We had 42 years without human rights and few knew 
what international humanitarian law was. All they knew was Gaddafi’s ethics. The atrocities 
made against many of the rebels who later committed atrocities, was beyond any human 
beings’ understanding, she says. Spokesman Galal is open about the change in behavior.   
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“At the time we had the upper hand, human nature sat in, some revenge was taking place, and violations 
were taking place. A person that says something else is a liar. Human rights organizations were on our 
back, and we tried to tell rebel soldiers to calm down. We tried to stop it and say ‘Look, you cannot be 
as bad as Gaddafi’s people’. We could not control every individual.” 
My informants say these atrocities obviously caused a suspicion towards the journalists 
wanting to tell the world about their actions. Busin says: “Naturally these people wanted to 
cover up on their own stories; they did not want the world to see this happening. This is why 
we saw this change in behavior.” He says he tried to be honest to the international journalists 
about what was going on. “I tried to tell the journalists that we had a slight problem with 
atrocities, and that there were a lot of stupid people with guns around. But all this is expected. 
It was a revolution and a war, in a country with no institutions, no foundation, and no 
infrastructure”. Elkish says he did not try to stop journalists reporting on the negative stories. 
“If we tried to stop the stories we were not really better than Gaddafi”.  
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6 Conclusion 
I have argued that it is important to investigate and reflect on the Libyan rebel movement and 
its media efforts, because they managed to do something many insurgencies have not 
managed before them: To grab the world’s attention and get international support for their 
cause in form of a UN Security Council resolution. To examine what the rebels did to obtain 
this attention and support has therefore been the focus of this thesis. I said I was going to 
examine “in what way the Libyan rebel movement organized and facilitated for international 
journalists during their rebellion, what factors motivated their effort, and to what extent they 
saw media as a useful tool in this struggle”. I interviewed international journalists and 
traveled to Libya to interview representatives of the rebel movement in a relatively chaotic 
post-conflict period. Here are the most important findings of my research: 
1. The rebel movement’s media organization was relatively large, was structured, and it 
emerged from below. There was no clear plan from the beginning, but as events 
intensified, both strategy and organizing evolved rapidly. The NTC made a hierarchic 
system with different units with different objectives. The media center was developed 
and run by activists, and was at first separate from the political and military movement 
NTC. The activists helped the journalists by giving them the facilities they needed 
without charge. To help journalists for free was seen as an important way to help the 
revolutionary cause. After three months the media center joined NTC under their 
umbrella. Separate diaspora organizations did also work to achieve the same 
objectives as the rebel movement inside Libya. Together, these groups’ media effort 
was comprehensive. The founders of the media committee argued to the leadership of 
NTC in the same way as Clifford Bob’s research claims other insurgent groups have 
thought before: The key is to grab media attention to create international awareness, 
and to encapsulate the rebels’ identity, grievances, and demands. It is about marketing 
of the rebellion. My research goes on to describe how such media awareness can 
evolve during a conflict. 
2. I have found that during the war in Libya there was a mutual dependence between the 
journalists and the rebels. Both groups needed each other to achieve what they wanted: 
The journalists needed the dramatic images, video footage and interviews that are 
required in news reports, and to get that, they needed proximity to the unfolding 
69 
 
events. Existing literature, like Lynch and McGoldrick, suggests that mainstream 
journalism are relatively violence-oriented, and that it has a tendency to focus on the 
visible effects of violence, like killed, wounded and material damage. In Libya, the 
rebels could grant the proximity the journalists needed. Thus, the journalists were 
highly dependent on acceptance from the rebels in the opposition-controlled areas. 
Without such acceptance from the rebels, the journalistic working-conditions would 
be difficult and dangerous. On the other hand, the rebels were highly dependent on 
journalists to spread the word about their uprising. They needed legitimacy and 
support from the international community and saw international media as a tool to get 
it. Without each other, the two parties’ goals would have been far more difficult to 
achieve. The mutual dependence led to a situation that promoted the goals of both 
rebels and journalists. It was a win-win situation. This situation helped the rebels’ 
cause, and by savvy and intense efforts they managed to take advantage of the 
situation and benefit from it. 
3. I have found that existing literature reflects and explains much of the Libyan rebels’ 
efforts towards international media: The insurgents had a revolutionary political goal, 
they needed legitimacy for their violent behavior and international support for their 
cause to achieve their goal. They saw international journalist and massive media 
attention as a vital weapon in their struggle. My research exemplifies an insurgent 
group’s need for legitimacy and external support, in a very specific manner. Without 
media attention, and the support they got, the rebels believe they hardly would have 
succeeded, and that their uprising could have been stifled. 
4. Some literature argues that today’s mass media reduce the scope for calm deliberation 
over policy, forcing policy-makers to respond to whatever issue journalists focuses on. 
The ‘CNN effect’ suggests that real-time communications technology could provoke 
major responses from domestic audiences and political elites to global events. I have 
found that my informants in the rebel movement believe in media’s role as an agenda-
setter, and they believe their intensive media efforts helped drum up the support for 
the UN Security Council decision to intervene in the conflict with a military 
campaign. By facilitating for journalists, and working to create awareness for their 
cause, they believe they affected the journalists, which again affected the political 
decision-making. Their line of thinking is closely connected with the arguments of the 
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debated CNN-effect. The rebels were increasingly concerned about getting their story 
told, and saw this as a crucial objective. As an example, press conferences were seen 
as marketing events. 
5. I have also found that the rebels used propaganda in their strategy, and that they had a 
‘psychological operation’ (PSYOPS) working during the war. The definition of 
PSYOPS fits the Libyan rebels: “It is efforts to convey selected truthful information 
and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective 
reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of their governments, organizations, groups, 
and individuals”. To some extent the rebels mislead and produced false information, 
and sometimes they tried to lead information in a direction that benefited them. This is 
journalistically problematic because many of the journalists were highly dependent on 
the rebels and the information they provided, and many journalists were uncritical in 
the use of the rebels’ services. Towards the end of the conflict the rebels in the front 
line were hostile to journalists that reported on their wrongdoings. When they were 
‘underdogs’ they strived for publicity, but when they had power they became more 
hostile. The strategized propaganda from NTC was mainly meant to counter the 
regime’s propaganda, and was sometimes used as a tool in physical battle on the 
ground. 
Because of the grave seriousness of military actions, the underlying causes leading up to such 
actions are important to investigate. My research has examined a group’s efforts to make a 
military intervention happen, and their arguments of why their violent struggle should be 
supported. As we know, the rebels’ media strategy worked. They got international help. This 
is where my research can be useful, and have implications for other researchers in this field: I 
describe the media efforts of an insurgency that succeeded in their objective, and I describe 
how they worked to achieve what they wanted. Here are suggestions to how my findings can 
be supplemented by further research: 
• With this examination as a basis, other researchers can compare the Libyan insurgency 
to other insurgencies and revolutions that have failed. What was present in the Libyan 
uprising that lacked in unsuccessful and failed revolutions? For example, the uprising 
in Syria has many of the same components as the one in Libya. What are the 
differences between the conflict in Libya and Syria? The answer is most likely 
complex, but still, one interesting aspect is that the number of international journalists 
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in Syria cannot match the numbers in Libya. When a government missile killed the 
famous American correspondent Marie Colvin as she hid in a makeshift rebel media 
center inside Homs, Syria, only five other journalists were with her. In the media 
center in Benghazi hundreds of journalists were coming and going continuously. 
• The thesis may also be supplemented by further research in the media/conflict field. I 
have investigated the rebels, but someone should examine the other side as well: The 
journalists, and the journalism they produced during the war. When such research is 
done, a more complete picture can be seen.  
• An important extension of my research would be an investigation of the international 
community’s political considerations prior to the intervention in Libya. My research 
does not investigate how the media attention given to the Libyan rebels actually 
affected the political decision-making. If media hype was one of the aspects leading to 
the bombing of Gaddafi’s regime, it is something that should be discussed.  
My investigation gives an example of what publicity efforts journalists may face from parties 
in a conflict in the 21st century. As before, journalists see highly sophisticated and advanced 
attempts to influence them, but now, with internet and an increasing number of global 24/7 
news networks, the reach of publicity in media has increased. Therefore it is even more 
important to investigate and illuminate such attempts.  
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Appendix: 
Interview Guides 
To journalists: 
1. Firstly, as background, when did you enter Libya for the first time, and how did you 
proceed covering the conflict throughout 2011? 
2. What attitudes towards international journalists did you experience on the rebel side, 
and what kind of message did the rebel fighters want to express? 
3. Is your impression that the rebel saw it as an advantage to have foreign media 
reporting on their situation, and in what way? Were they helpful towards you in the 
towns they held and in the front line? 
4. In what way did the rebels talk about the importance of foreign help and support in 
their fight against Gaddafi? Did they see external support as crucial? 
5. Journalist I have spoken to say the rebels changed during the conflict. When they were 
underdogs in the beginning, they really wanted journalist to report on everything they 
said and did. But after they entered Tripoli, and were fighting for Sirte, they became 
increasingly hostile, because journalists also reported on their wrongdoings. Is this a 
conclusion you support? Did you experience this? 
6. Is your impression that the rebels succeeded in giving a positive impression in the 
beginning of the conflict? 
7. They even made a media centre in Benghazi, with a lot of services for journalists. 
How do you think this worked to help bringing their message of “the good guys” 
forward? 
8. How did the NTC leadership handle the media, as you see it? 
9. You have worked extensively with the Libyan conflict. How was this conflict different 
from other conflict you have covered, and why? 
To activist in media center: 
1. If you could start out by telling me: What was your position during the revolution in 
Libya. What was your work? 
2. How did you end up in that job? What position did you have before the revolution? 
3. At what point during the beginning of the revolution did people see the need for 
getting people to work with media questions? 
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4. What was said about the importance of the media in the revolution from in the 
beginning? 
5. What was you motivation for working to help the media? 
6. How did you build up the media centre? How did you organize? 
7. What message did you want to give the journalist of the Libyan uprising? 
8. Why do you think people of Benghazi was so happy about the journalist being there? 
9. How important did you see the need for external support for the uprising to succeed? 
NATO help. Did you knew it was vital for the uprising to succeed? 
10. Did you believe that media coverage was important to help getting external support? 
11. Did you feel that the media reported the story as you wanted it to be? 
12. Did you try to influence them to report in any way? 
13. What was the most difficult thing working with journalists? 
14. Do you think the foreign media helped the rebels gain legitimacy for its cause? 
15. Why do you think so many journalists came to report about the Libyan war? 
16. What was the biggest problem dealing with journalists? 
To NTC leadership: 
1. If you could start out by telling me: What was your position during the revolution in 
Libya. What was your work? 
2. How did you end up in that job? What position did you have before the revolution? 
3. At what point during the making of NTC did the organization see the need for people 
working with media questions such as you? 
4. What was said about the importance of the media in the revolution from in the 
beginning? 
5. What was your strengths and Gaddafi’s weakness in terms of legitimacy? 
6. How did NTC organize its media work and press conferences? 
7. Why is media handling so crucial in a conflict, do you think? 
8. Did NTC have a plan on how to deal with the numbers of journalists that came to 
Libya? Or did it happen as it went on? 
9. What message was it important for NTC to express to the journalists? How did you 
wish to portray yourself? 
10. Gaddafi propaganda claimed some of the revolutionaries were thugs and that had 
connections with al-Qaida. He tried to shed a negative light on you. How important 
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was it for you to counter these claims so that the world rather could have a positive 
image of the rebels? 
11. How important did you see the need for external support for the uprising to succeed? 
Did you think that it was vital for the uprising to succeed? 
12. Did you believe that media coverage was important to help getting external support? 
13. Did the NTC see it as a benefit that almost all international journalists were reporting 
from Benghazi?  
14. Did you see the media as a tool for the uprising? Did NTC think that? 
15. What do you think about the job the young people of Benghazi did by helping media 
so much out? Did it help you? 
16. What did you do to inform the media as best as you could? 
17. Do you think the foreign media helped the rebels gain legitimacy for their cause? 
18. Did you have your own propaganda as well?  
19. Many journalists reported on rebels wrongdoing, and bad behavior. What did you 
think when such information came out? 
20. Toward the end: Why do you think the Libyan revolution attracted so many 
journalists? 
21. Could the revolution succeed without journalists telling the story? 
 
 
 
